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1 
THE PERILS OF PHILANTHROCAPITALISM 
ERIC FRANKLIN AMARANTE* 
ABSTRACT 
 For over a century, philosophers, politicians, and sociologists 
have bemoaned philanthropy’s inherent antidemocratic, paternal-
istic, and amateuristic aspects.  The antidemocratic nature of phi-
lanthropy is self-evident: When a wealthy person determines the 
best way to address a societal problem without the input of either 
society at large or the intended beneficiaries of the philanthropy, 
the result is a deficit of democracy.  Philanthropy’s amateurism 
stems from the illogical belief that wealthy individuals ought to ad-
dress some of the world’s most complex and intransigent problems 
simply because they successfully amassed a fortune in the private 
sector.  The paternalism critique focuses on the assumption that 
many of society’s problems are born out of the personality faults 
of charity beneficiaries. 
 Because most philanthropists formed private foundations to con-
duct their charitable work, the regime that regulates private foun-
dations evolved to mitigate the three aforementioned negatives: 
antidemocracy, paternalism, and amateurism.  More specifically, 
the law requires private foundations to avoid political activity, 
spend a certain percentage of funds in a charitable manner, and 
submit extensive annual reports.  In this manner, the legal regime 
struck a palatable balance between philanthropy’s inherent nega-
tive aspects and philanthropy’s obvious positives. 
 However, the recent trend of philanthropists conducting charity 
through for-profit vehicles, such as limited liability companies 
(“LLCs”), effectively bypasses the restrictions placed upon private 
foundations.  This Article will discuss each of the traditional cri-
tiques of philanthropy and explore how they are exacerbated when 
philanthropic efforts are shifted to LLCs.  Ultimately, this Article 
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will argue that philanthropy conducted through LLCs will un-
doubtedly be less democratic, more amateuristic, and more pater-
nalistic than philanthropy conducted through private foundations.  
This Article will conclude with some thoughts concerning several 
potential solutions to the problem, including the adjustment of in-
centives for private foundations and LLCs, imposing a regulatory 
regime over philanthropic activity, extending existing licensing re-
gimes to apply to certain philanthropic activity, and the potential 
of a social license to conduct philanthropy. 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 1, 2015, in a Facebook post celebrating the birth of their 
daughter, Mark Zuckerberg and Dr. Priscilla Chan announced a pledge of 
Facebook stock worth $45 billion to the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative (“CZI”), 
a new entity dedicated to “personalized learning, curing disease, connecting 
people[,] and building strong communities.”1  In making this pledge, they 
followed in the footsteps of other tech billionaires, such as Laurene Powell 
Jobs2 and Pierre Omidyar,3 who dedicated significant portions of their for-
tunes to charitable activity.  However, many of these announcements were 
met with more skepticism than praise.  Chan and Zuckerberg’s announce-
ment, for example, drew accusations that the pledge was merely a tax-avoid-
ance scheme4 and that it amounted to nothing more than the couple donating 
money to themselves.5 
                                                          
 1.  Mark Zuckerberg, A Letter to Our Daughter, FACEBOOK (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.fa-
cebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-letter-to-our-daughter/10153375081581634 (“We will give 
99% of our Facebook shares—currently about $45 billion—during our lives to advance this mis-
sion.”). 
 2.  Laurene Powell Jobs, widow of Steve Jobs, founded and leads the Emerson Collective.  
#20 Laurene Powell Jobs & Family, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/profile/laurene-powell-jobs/ 
(last updated Nov. 7, 2018).  The Emerson Collective is “an organization dedicated to removing 
barriers to opportunity so people can live to their full potential.”  Our Mission, EMERSON 
COLLECTIVE, www.emersoncollective.com/about-us (last visited Sept. 17, 2018). 
 3.  Pierre Omidyar, the founder of eBay, runs the Omidyar Network, a “philanthropic invest-
ment firm” driven by the belief that “if we invest in people, through opportunity, they will create 
positive returns for themselves, their families, and the world at large.”  Who We Are, OMIDYAR 
NETWORK, www.omidyar.com/who-we-are (last visited Sept. 13, 2018). 
 4.  Mahita Gajanan, Mark Zuckerberg Defends Philanthropic Venture Against Tax Avoidance 
Claims, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/dec/05/mark-
zuckerberg-defends-philanthropic-venture-tax-avoidance-claims (“Critics have said the company 
structure could allow Zuckerberg to avoid paying tax on his sale of the shares.  By donating stock, 
Zuckerberg gets a charitable contribution deduction based on the fair market value of the shares, 
according to Forbes.”). 
 5.  Jeremy C. Owens, Zuckerberg Answers Critics with Details on LLC, MARKETWATCH 
(Dec. 3, 2015, 6:14 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/zuckerberg-answers-critics-with-de-
tails-on-llc-2015-12-03 (noting that “Zuckerberg . . . responded to several commenters . . . [includ-
ing] one Facebook user who wrote, ‘So you’ll donate money to yourself’”). 
 2018] THE PERILS OF PHILANTHROCAPITALISM 3 
At first blush, this negative response is surprising.  The couple promised 
to dedicate their considerable financial resources to charity;6 what could pos-
sibly be objectionable about a wealthy couple dedicating their fortune to the 
greater good? 
The crux of the discomfort lies in the couple’s decision to organize the 
CZI as a for-profit LLC, rather than as a more traditional tax-exempt private 
foundation.7  Although philanthropists increasingly use novel and innovative 
means of engaging in charity,8 philanthropy is traditionally conducted 
through private foundations because of the entity’s generous tax savings.9  In 
fact, until recently, the working assumption was that a rational wealthy per-
son would choose the private foundation over other options precisely for the 
attendant tax benefits.10 
Despite the potential tax savings, Chan and Zuckerberg decided to es-
chew the private foundation form and instead establish the CZI as a for-profit 
vehicle.  Perhaps anticipating the criticism this decision might inspire, Zuck-
erberg defended the decision by pointing to the limitations of the private 
foundation form,11 highlighting the LLC’s ability to not only fund nonprofit 
                                                          
 6.  See Zuckerberg, supra note 1 (explaining that the CZI hopes to make investments designed 
to “eliminate poverty and hunger,” “provide everyone with basic healthcare,” “build inclusive and 
welcoming communities,” “nurture peaceful and understanding relationships between people of all 
nations,” and “truly empower everyone—women, children, underrepresented minorities, immi-
grants and the unconnected”).  
 7.  Natasha Singer & Mike Issac, Mark Zuckerberg’s Philanthropy Uses L.L.C. for More Con-
trol, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/technology/zuckerbergs-philan-
thropy-uses-llc-for-more-control.html. 
 8.  See Stephanie Strom, What’s Wrong With Profit?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/13/us/13strom.html (“This year, as never before, the line be-
tween philanthropy and business is blurring.  A new generation of philanthropists has stepped for-
ward, for the most part young billionaires who have reaped the benefits of capitalism and believe 
that it can be applied in the service of charity.  They are ‘philanthropreneurs,’ driven to do good and 
have their profit, too.”).  For example, the Omidyar Network is a joint effort between a tax-exempt 
entity (sometimes referred to as charitable organizations or 501(c)(3)s) and an LLC.  See Financials, 
OMIDYAR NETWORK, https://www.omidyar.com/financials (last visited May 19, 2018).  A 501(c)(3) 
organization is a nonprofit entity that has obtained tax-exempt status from the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”) by proving that it is organized and operated for a charitable purpose. Generally 
speaking, donations to 501(c)(3) organizations are tax-deductible. See Exemption Requirements - 
501(c)(3) Organizations, I.R.S. https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organiza-
tions/exemption-requirements-section-501c3-organizations (last updated Dec. 28, 2017).  The Em-
erson Collective is formed as an LLC.  See Privacy Policy, EMERSON COLLECTIVE, http://www.em-
ersoncollective.com/privacy-policy (last visited May 19, 2018). 
 9.  This Article will discuss the private foundation form and the form’s tax benefits in more 
detail.  See infra notes 320–324 and accompanying text.   
 10.  Robert Frank, Mark Zuckerberg’s Unusual Method of Charitable Giving, CNBC: INSIDE 
WEALTH (Dec. 2, 2015, 9:44 AM), www.cnbc.com/2015/12/02/mark-zuckerbergs-unusual-
method-of-charitable-giving.html (“When most billionaires give money to charity, they create a 
foundation or give directly to a not-for-profit company or charitable trust.”). 
 11.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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organizations (the traditional recipients of private foundation grants),12 but 
also to make investments in private enterprises.13  Zuckerberg emphasized 
the “flexibility” of an LLC, arguing it will help the founders “execute [the 
CZI’s] mission more effectively” by allowing the CZI “to give to the organ-
izations that will do the best work—regardless of how they’re structured.”14  
Further, Zuckerberg expressed some concern over the political limitations of 
private foundations by noting, “We must participate in policy and advocacy 
to shape debates” to “advance human potential and promote equality.”15  The 
CZI might, for example, lobby for more permissive state laws governing 
charter schools or advocate for more federal spending on public health.16 
Zuckerberg feared that the private foundation rules against lobbying and po-
litical activity would limit the CZI’s effectiveness in such debates. 
Such concerns have merit.  Generally speaking, philanthropists who 
start private foundations sacrifice some flexibility to enjoy the form’s tax 
benefits.17  Although Zuckerberg’s stated justifications for choosing an LLC 
might undersell the flexibility of private foundations,18 he is certainly correct 
that private foundations are virtually prohibited from engaging in policy de-
bates through either lobbying or political activity.19  In stark contrast to pri-
vate foundations, LLCs have absolutely no limitation on the investments they 
may make or the amount of lobbying activities in which they might engage.  
And, while private foundations enjoy considerable tax benefits, LLCs do 
not.20  Thus, it appears that Chan and Zuckerberg valued the ability of LLCs 
                                                          
 12.  See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 25–27 (10th ed. 
2011); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 13.  See Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Dec. 3, 2015), www.face-
book.com/zuck/posts/10102507695055801 (“[Structuring the CZI as an LLC] enables us to pursue 
our mission by funding non-profit organizations, making private investments and participating in 
policy debates . . . .”). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Zuckerberg, supra note 1; see Zuckerberg, supra note 13. 
 16.  Zuckerberg, supra note 1; see Zuckerberg, supra note 13. 
 17.  This Article will discuss the private foundation form and the form’s tax benefits in more 
detail.  See infra notes 320–324 and accompanying text.   
 18.  For example, despite Zuckerberg’s implication otherwise, private foundations may make 
investments in private enterprises in the form of program related investments.  This Article will 
discuss program related investments in more detail.  See infra notes 292–303 and accompanying 
text. 
 19.  Although private foundations are technically permitted to engage in lobbying activities, the 
excise tax on lobbying efforts “is so significant that it generally acts as a lobbying prohibition.”  See 
Lobbying Activity of Section 501(c)(3) Private Foundations, I.R.S., https://www.irs.gov/charities-
non-profits/private-foundations/lobbying-activity-of-section-501c3-private-foundations (last up-
dated Apr. 3, 2018). 
 20.  But see Dana Brakman Reiser, Disruptive Philanthropy: Zuckerberg, the Limited Liability 
Company, and the Millionaire Next Door 26 (Brooklyn Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 536, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3049021 (arguing that the tax 
benefits of private foundations might be overstated in this context). 
 2018] THE PERILS OF PHILANTHROCAPITALISM 5 
to engage in political discussions and influence policy much more than the 
potential tax savings of a private foundation. 
This inquiry begs the question: Why should we care how Chan and 
Zuckerberg engage in philanthropic activity?  The couple decided to forgo 
tax savings in the interest of flexibility; so what?  The $45 billion is, after all, 
their money.  Does the public have any legitimate interest in how they spend 
it?21  If the couple decided the tax savings were not attractive enough to jus-
tify the extra administrative and regulatory burden associated with a private 
foundation, why should the public care? 
The reason the public does (and should very much) care is that Chan 
and Zuckerberg’s decision presents troubling questions about the role of phi-
lanthropy in our society and the consequences of philanthropists using for-
profit vehicles to engage in charitable work. 
The traditional critiques of philanthropy, broadly summarized, are that 
philanthropy is antidemocratic by definition, paternalistic by tradition, and 
amateuristic by design.22  The antidemocratic nature of philanthropy is self-
evident: When a wealthy person determines the best way to address a societal 
problem without the input of either society at large or the philanthropist’s 
beneficiaries, the result is a deficit of democracy.23  The paternalism critique 
focuses on the assumption that many of society’s problems are born out of 
the personality faults of charity beneficiaries.24  This type of thinking leads 
one to believe a person is not poor due to, for example, America’s informal 
                                                          
 21.  MEGAN E. TOMPKINS-STANGE, POLICY PATRONS: PHILANTHROPY, EDUCATION REFORM, 
AND THE POLITICS OF INFLUENCE 140 (2016) (noting that some supporters of private foundation 
work “rejected the suggestion that foundations should be more democratically operated or inclusive 
of the public, citing a distinctively American value: the rights of individuals to exercise their per-
sonal private property according to their legally protected preferences,” and that any regulations 
“will be fought like crazy because it will be seen as an unwarranted intervention by the feds and 
[people will say], ‘It’s my money and I do what I want with it’” (alteration in original)). 
 22.  Lester Salamon, Of Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third-Party Government: To-
ward a Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State, 16 NONPROFIT & 
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 29, 39–42 (1987).  Salamon describes four “voluntary failures” of philan-
thropy: “philanthropic insufficiency” (pointing out “[o]nly when contributions are made involun-
tary, as they are through taxation, are they therefore likely to be sufficient and consistent”), “phil-
anthropic particularism” (noting “the tendency of voluntary organizations and the benefactors to 
focus on particular subgroups of the population”), “philanthropic paternalism” (“the voluntary sys-
tem . . . vests most of the influence over the definition of community needs in the hands of those in 
command of the greatest resources”), and “philanthropic amateurism.”  Id.  
 23.  See infra Section II.A.  
 24.  See infra Section II.B. 
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caste system,25 but rather because the person is lazy or lacks imagination.26 
Finally, philanthropy’s amateurism stems from the illogical belief that 
wealthy individuals are equipped to address some of the world’s most com-
plex and intransigent problems simply because they successfully amassed a 
fortune in the private sector.27   
To date, the only answer to these critiques is the regulatory regime that 
governs the traditional vehicle for philanthropic activity: the private founda-
tion.  Private foundations are, for example, prohibited from engaging in po-
litical activity.  In this manner, the wealth invested in private foundations 
cannot be used to influence democratic institutions, resulting in some protec-
tion against the antidemocratic aspects of philanthropy.28  Further, private 
foundations must engage in a minimum amount of charitable spending, so 
the general public has some assurance that the tax benefits bestowed will re-
sult in some charitable activity.  This requirement protects against both the 
antidemocratic and paternalistic aspects of philanthropy.29  Finally, private 
foundations are required to provide extensive disclosures,30 which protects 
against both the antidemocratic and paternalistic tendencies of philanthro-
pists.31 
This Article will argue that the legal regime governing private founda-
tions has struck a palatable balance between philanthropy’s inherent negative 
consequences and philanthropy’s obviously positive aspects.  In other words, 
the public is willing to suffer limited amounts of antidemocracy, paternalism, 
and amateurism in exchange for the positive aspects of philanthropy.  How-
ever, the recent trend of philanthropists using for-profit vehicles to conduct 
charity effectively bypasses the regime’s restrictions, leaving philanthropists 
free to indulge in their worst instincts.  Without the protections of the private 
foundation regime, the CZI may use its considerable financial leverage to 
sway elections, dictate how American children are educated, and unilaterally 
determine the priority of public health initiatives, all behind the LLC’s shroud 
                                                          
 25.  Subramanian Shankar, Does America Have a Caste System?, SALON (Jan. 27, 2018, 6:30 
PM), https://www.salon.com/2018/01/27/does-america-have-a-caste-system_partner/ (“At bottom, 
caste’s most defining feature is its ability to render inevitable a rigid and pervasive hierarchical 
system of inclusion and exclusion.  What working-class Americans and people of color have vis-
cerally recognized, in my experience, is that casteist ideologies—theories that produce a social hi-
erarchy and then freeze it for time immemorial—also permeate their world.”). 
 26.  Maia Szalavitz, Why Do We Think Poor People Are Poor Because of Their Own Bad 
Choices?, GUARDIAN (July 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jul/05/us-ine-
quality-poor-people-bad-choices-wealthy-bias (“Among the wealthy, those biases allow society’s 
winners to believe that they got where they are by hard work alone and so they deserve what they 
have—while seeing those who didn’t make it as having failed due to lack of grit and merit.”). 
 27.  See infra Section II.C. 
 28.  See infra Section III.C (discussing prohibition against political activity and the limitation 
on lobbying). 
 29.  See infra Section III.B (discussing mandatory payout rules). 
 30.  See infra Section III.D.1 (discussing Form 990PF). 
 31.  See infra Section III.D. 
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of secrecy and lack of disclosure.32  Although scholars have discussed the 
benefits of using for-profit vehicles to engage in philanthropy,33 and several 
have discussed the tax treatment of this practice,34 few legal scholars have 
addressed the negative social consequences of such decisions35 or proposed 
possible solutions to this emerging problem. 
This Article will discuss each of the traditional critiques of philanthropy 
and explore how they are exacerbated when philanthropic efforts are con-
ducted through for-profit vehicles.  Part I of this Article will outline recent 
trends in American philanthropy, including a brief exploration of the dis-
tinctly American practice of relying upon our wealthiest individuals to pro-
vide basic social needs and the rise of “philanthrocapitalism,” a term that 
describes the belief that business philosophies will improve the effectiveness 
of traditional philanthropy.36  Part II will set forth the traditional critiques of 
philanthropy, discussing the antidemocratic, paternalistic, and amateuristic 
aspects of traditional philanthropy.  Part III will explore why many philan-
thropists are drawn to use LLCs rather than the more traditional private foun-
dation, ultimately arguing that they are attracted to the relative lack of regu-
lation, scrutiny, and oversight of LLCs, which exacerbate the antidemocratic, 
paternalistic, and amateuristic aspects of philanthropy.  Part IV will detail 
some potential solutions to the problems, including an adjustment of incen-
tives for both private foundations and LLCs, a regulatory regime over phil-
anthropic activity, a licensing regime for certain philanthropic activity, and 
                                                          
 32.  See, e.g., Steve Reilly & Trevor Hughes, Tiny Wyoming Office at Heart of Panama Papers 
Empire, USA TODAY (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/04/06/panama-
papers-why-wyoming-hub-for-shell-companies/82697186/ (reporting that M.F. Corporate Services 
Wyoming LLC, an entity associated with the Panama Papers scandal, “helped register more than a 
dozen other [LLCs] in [Wyoming] behind the cloak of Wyoming’s corporate secrecy protections”). 
 33.  See Brakman Reiser, supra note 20, at 4 (“For-profit vehicles for philanthropy, and partic-
ularly the philanthropy LLC model, provide founders substantial operational flexibility. . . . [A]n 
LLC is free to combine traditional grantmaking with strategic investments and political advocacy.”); 
Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2452 (2009) [herein-
after Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy] (discussing the advantages of Google’s for-profit 
philanthropic entity). 
 34.  See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, Single Member Limited Liability 
Companies, and Fiduciary Duties, 52 A.B.A. REAL PROP., TR. & EST. J. 153, 190–92 (2017). 
 35.  But see Brakman Reiser, supra note 20, at 43 (noting that using LLCs for philanthropy 
“magnif[ies] the most negative aspect of traditional nonprofit giving: essentially, that it is elitist”); 
Garry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 786–87 
(2011).  However, Professor Dana Brakman Reiser largely limits her discussion of the negatives of 
for-profit philanthropy to a section toward the end of the article, and Professor Garry Jenkins focuses 
primarily on philanthrocapitalism’s fondness for business techniques, not the use of for-profit vehi-
cles to engage in charitable activity.  
 36.  “Philanthrocapitalism” is a term with an evolving meaning. Many credit Michael Green 
and Matthew Bishop’s Philanthrocapitalism: How Giving Can Save the World with coining this 
term.  MATTHEW BISHOP & MICHAEL GREEN, PHILANTHROCAPITALISM: HOW GIVING CAN SAVE 
THE WORLD (2008).  However, the term appeared a few years earlier in an article in The Economist.  
See The Birth of Philanthrocapitalism, ECONOMIST (Feb. 23, 2006), https://www.econo-
mist.com/special-report/2006/02/23/the-birth-of-philanthrocapitalism.  
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the potential for a social license to engage in philanthropy.  Part V will con-
clude. 
I.  THE RISE OF THE PHILANTHROCAPITALIST 
A.  Traditional Philanthropy 
The wealthy elite of the early twentieth century—a group that includes 
Andrew Carnegie,37 John Rockefeller,38 and Edsel Ford, the son of Henry 
Ford39—created foundations that funded charitable activities across the globe 
since the early 1900s.  The philanthropic ideologies of these fathers40 of mod-
ern American philanthropy represent the traditional approach to charitable 
activity that, until recently, characterized the consensus philanthropic ap-
proach in the United States.  More to the point, much of traditional philan-
thropic behavior is relatively passive.41  Rather than instructing grantees on 
precisely how to spend a particular donation, the traditional philanthropist 
donates money and allows recipients latitude to determine how to spend the 
donation.42  For example, if a traditional philanthropist were concerned about 
child malnutrition, they might simply give money to an organization that pro-
vides food to hungry children.  The traditional philanthropist would not, for 
example, dictate to the recipient organization what type of food to provide, 
                                                          
 37.  Foundation History, CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, 
https://www.carnegiefoundation.org/who-we-are/foundation-history/ (last visited May 4, 2018). 
 38.  Our History, ROCKEFELLER FOUND., https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-
us/our-history/ (last visited May 4, 2018). 
 39.  Our Origins, FORD FOUND., https://www.fordfoundation.org/about-us/our-origins/ (last 
visited May 4, 2018). 
 40.  The gendered term is very much intentional, as the traditional philanthropists of the Gilded 
Age were almost exclusively men.  There were, however, a number of very active female heirs of 
these men, including Brooke Astor, Abby Aldrich Rockefeller, Jane Lathrop Stanford, and Gertrude 
Vanderbilt Whitney.  Jill Silos-Rooney, Gilded Age Wives Set Philanthropy’s Gold Standard, 
PHILANTHROPY WOMEN (Sept. 12, 2017), https://philanthropywomen.org/feminist-founda-
tions/gilded-age-wives-set-philanthropys-gold-standard/. 
 41.  It is important to note that even these venerated institutions are not completely immune 
from the allure of philanthrocapitalism.  See, e.g., Jon Pratt & Ruth McCambridge, The Ford Foun-
dation’s Bold Move: A Cool $1B from Endowment for Mission-Related Investments, NONPROFIT Q. 
(Apr. 5, 2017), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2017/04/05/ford-foundation-endowment-mission-
philanthropy/ (noting the Ford Foundation’s recent expansion of its program-related investment ac-
tivity). 
 42.  See Jenkins, supra note 35, at 758–59 (noting that philanthrocapitalism’s “proponents have 
billed this new form of philanthropy as one that is more ambitious, more strategic, more global, and 
more results oriented, requiring higher levels of personal involvement by donors than more tradi-
tional approaches.  Less often discussed in the literature, however, is the fact that although donors 
have always had a certain degree of disproportionate control in grantor-grantee relationships, this 
new movement, with its use of cutting-edge language about strategy and effectiveness, exacerbates 
the divide and strains these relationships further.  As a result, grantmakers influenced by this move-
ment are becoming more paternalistic, leaning toward foundation-centered problem-solving models 
that disempower grantees and the communities they serve.  And more and more grantmakers are 
remaking themselves in this troubling new image.”). 
 2018] THE PERILS OF PHILANTHROCAPITALISM 9 
which children to feed, and how often to provide food.  The traditional philan-
thropist simply provides money to a charitable organization and trusts it will 
spend the money well.43  This traditional approach is losing favor to a new 
approach: philanthrocapitalism. 
B.  “Philanthrocapitalism: How the Rich Can Save the World and Why 
We Should Let Them”44 
In stark contrast to the traditional model of philanthropy, modern philan-
thropists have shown interest in a more active role, applying business philos-
ophies to their charitable efforts in the hope of increasing the efficiency or 
effectiveness of their philanthropic activity.  This general trend is known as 
philanthrocapitalism.45  The conceit of philanthrocapitalism is that the entre-
preneurial spirit and successful business strategies of the for-profit world 
might be used to make philanthropy more effective and efficient.46  Unlike 
the traditional philanthropist, the posture of the philanthrocapitalist is one of 
hands-on proactivity.47  According to Professor Janie Chuang, “Unlike the 
old breed of philanthropist who, in considering which proposals to fund, 
weighed various stories told by others to determine which vision to fund, [the 
philanthrocapitalist] is the storyteller.”48  In increasingly novel ways, philan-
throcapitalists dictate the narrative and demand more involvement in the de-
cisions of how and where to spend philanthropic dollars.49 
Philanthrocapitalism, in various forms, is quite popular and is rapidly 
overtaking traditional philanthropy as the preferred method of charitable in-
tervention.50  While the definition of philanthrocapitalism continues to 
                                                          
 43.  This trust, of course, has its limits, as many private foundations require extensive reporting 
from their grantees to track how the money is spent.  Jessica Bearman & Elizabeth Myrick, Time to 
Revisit Reporting, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PHILANTHROPY (Sept. 29, 2017), https://cep.org/time-re-
visit-reporting/. 
 44.  This was the original title of Michael Green and Matthew Bishop’s book about philan-
throcapitalism.  Later editions of the book changed the subtitle to “How Giving Can Save the 
World.”  Compare BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 36, with MATTHEW BISHOP & MICHAEL GREEN, 
PHILANTHROCAPITALISM: HOW THE RICH CAN SAVE THE WORLD AND WHY WE SHOULD LET 
THEM (2008).  
 45.  See id. 
 46.  See id. 
 47.  See The Birth of Philanthrocapitalism, supra note 36 (describing the new “hands-on” phil-
anthropic approach as “venture philanthropy”). 
 48.  Janie A. Chuang, Giving as Governance? Philanthrocapitalism and Modern-Day Slavery 
Abolitionism, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1516, 1526 (2015). 
 49.  According to philanthrocapitalist cheerleaders, this is because these philanthropists cannot 
shake their entrepreneurial essence.  See FAQ, PHILANTHROCAPITALISM, http://philanthrocapital-
ism.net/about/faq/ (last visited May 4, 2018) (“Entrepreneurs are . . . by nature, problem-solvers and 
relish the challenge of taking on tough issues: [F]or Bill Gates, it is malaria and other infectious 
diseases, for George Soros it is political change.”). 
 50.  See infra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.  Professor Brakman Reiser may have pre-
dicted this trend when she noted, “Blending philanthropy and business has long been in fashion and 
entities have pursued it in a variety of ways.  In fact, calls for capitalism to spearhead solutions to 
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evolve, one might confidently use it to refer to both the application of for-
profit business strategies to charitable giving and the use of for-profit vehi-
cles, such as LLCs, to engage in charity. 
With respect to the latter category of philanthrocapitalism, Chan and 
Zuckerberg’s decision to use an LLC to conduct philanthropy is only the lat-
est incarnation of this practice.  For example, Pierre Omidyar, the founder of 
eBay, operates his philanthropic endeavor, the Omidyar Network, through 
both a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization and an LLC.51  Of the $1.1 billion 
committed to the Omidyar Network, about $581 million was granted to non-
profits and $523 million was invested in for-profit endeavors.52  Tony Hseih, 
the founder of Zappos, invested $350 million in an LLC to transform down-
town Las Vegas into “a place of [i]nspiration, [e]ntrepreneurial [e]nergy, 
[c]reativity, [i]nnovation, [u]pward [m]obility, and [d]iscovery.”53  Laurene 
Powell Jobs formed the Emerson Collective, an entity dedicated to support-
ing “education, immigration reform, the environment, health, and other social 
justice initiatives,” as an LLC.54  Thus, the CZI joins a rapidly growing fam-
ily of for-profit vehicles engaging in activity that, until recently, was largely 
limited to private foundations. 
C.  Philanthropy’s Unique Role in the United States 
The trend of conducting philanthropic efforts through for-profit entities 
is particularly concerning in the United States because of the extent to which 
this country relies upon private philanthropists to provide general social wel-
fare.  This is very different from how philanthropy is conducted—and how 
social welfare is provided—in other countries.  While most developed coun-
tries rely upon their government for matters of general social welfare, the 
United States depends upon the private market to provide a large portion of 
basic services.  In contrast to Europe, where countries “devote 25[%] or more 
of their [gross domestic product (“GDP”)] to government-funded social wel-
fare activities,” the United States dedicates only 16% of its GDP to such ac-
tivities.55  Further, countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
                                                          
society’s greatest problems are mounting all the time.”  Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 
supra note 33, at 2452. 
 51.  See OMIDYAR NETWORK, BUILDING A PHILANTHROPIC INVESTMENT FIRM 3 (n.d.),  
https://www.omidyar.com/sites/default/files/file_archive/Omidyar%20Network%20Approach.pdf. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See Mission, DOWNTOWN PROJECT, https://downtownproject.com/mission/ (last visited 
May 4, 2018).  The philanthrocapitalist roots of this project might be most evident in the fact that 
Hseih was forced to emphasize that his project was “not a charity” and would not endeavor to “solve 
every single problem that exists [in the] city.”  Joe Schoenmann, Joe Downtown: Hsieh Says Down-
town Project Not a Charity, Can’t Solve Every Community Problem, VEGAS INC (Feb. 7, 2014, 
2:00 AM), https://vegasinc.lasvegassun.com/business/2014/feb/07/joe-downtown-hsieh-says-
downtown-project-not-chari/. 
 54.  Our Mission, supra note 2. 
 55.  LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 72 (3d ed. 2012). 
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and Development (“OECD”) spend an average of about 20.5% of their GDP 
on social welfare spending, or about 4.5% more than the United States.56 
If the lag in public spending on social welfare (as compared to other 
countries) is made up by philanthropy, that might explain why the United 
States is viewed as the world leader in terms of individual philanthropic giv-
ing.57  Indeed, it is often stated that Americans are some of the most generous 
people on Earth.58  This claim, although questionable,59 is based on the 
amount of money Americans donate to charitable causes, which represents a 
“significantly higher rate of private charitable giving as a share of GDP than 
most other developed countries.”60 
The generosity of Americans is impressive, with roots in the distinc-
tively American notions of individuality and self-sufficiency that date as far 
back as the founding of the country, when Alexis de Tocqueville noted the 
peculiarly American penchant for creating private associations to address 
public issues.61  Noting that he “admired the infinite art with which the in-
habitants of the United States managed to fix a common goal to the efforts of 
many men and to get them to advance to it freely,” de Tocqueville concluded 
that “[t]he health of a democratic society may be measured by the quality of 
functions performed by private citizens.”62 
The American proclivity for private associations is certainly admirable, 
but one wonders if it is practical.  The combination of this “deep-seated tra-
dition of individualism” with another peculiar American tradition, the “in-
grained hostility to centralized institutions,” results in a predictable distaste 
for government spending on public welfare.63  This aversion has persisted 
throughout American history,64 perhaps cresting with President Ronald 
Reagan’s observation that “we’ve let government take away many things we 
                                                          
 56.  Id. at 73. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  See Jeff Jacoby, The Extraordinary Generosity of Ordinary Americans, BOSTON GLOBE 
(Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2016/01/28/the-extraordinary-
generosity-ordinary-americans/sSYhKTwI2mJxSZp8PN7csM/story.html (“The scope of American 
philanthropy is unparalleled anywhere on Earth.  In 2014, Americans gave nearly $360 billion to 
charity, the highest total ever recorded.”). 
 59.  The Charities Aid Foundation’s World Giving Index 2016 ranks Myanmar first, with “more 
than nine in ten people in Myanmar donat[ing] money in the month prior to interview,” with the 
United States coming in second.  CHARITIES AID FOUND., CAF WORLD GIVING INDEX 2016: THE 
WORLD’S LEADING STUDY OF GENEROSITY 5, 8 (2016), https://www.cafonline.org/docs/default-
source/about-us-publications/1950a_wgi_2016_report_web_v2_241016.pdf. 
 60.  SALAMON, supra note 55, at 73. 
 61.  See Rob Atkinson, Tax Favors for Philanthropy: Should Our Republic Underwrite de 
Tocqueville’s Democracy?, 6 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 1, 88 (2014). 
 62.  ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 489 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) 
(1835). 
 63.  SALAMON, supra note 55, at 1. 
 64.  Id. at 1–2. 
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once considered were really ours to do voluntarily.”65  In this spirit, for better 
or worse, the United States “resisted the worldwide movement toward pre-
dominantly governmental approaches to social welfare provision, adding 
new governmental protections only with great reluctance and then structuring 
them in ways that preserve a substantial private role.”66 
Defenders of the status quo might suggest that we have struck a worka-
ble, if imperfect, balance between government-provided welfare and private 
philanthropy.  The American people prefer those more well-off to provide a 
social safety net.  However, this preference only makes sense if the amount 
of charitable giving is sufficient to meet public needs.  Unfortunately, Amer-
ican charitable giving does not make up for the difference in governmental 
spending compared to other countries.  As noted by Dr. Lester Salamon, pri-
vate charitable giving in the United States “amounts to only 0.7 to 1.8[%] of 
GDP.”67  Given that the United States, in terms of government social welfare 
spending as a percent of GDP, trails most European countries by 9%68 and 
OECD countries by 4.5%,69 the generosity of Americans comes up short with 
respect to comparable countries. 
Critics of a government-run welfare system point out that America’s di-
verse populace makes democracy an inept tool to find agreement on how to 
address a particular societal ill.70  That is, “religious, ethnic, [and] racial di-
versity make[] it difficult for citizens to come to agreement on the range of 
collective goods they want, thus making it impossible to generate the major-
ity support needed to trigger a governmental response in a democracy.”71  As 
explained by Rob Reich: 
[S]tandard models of political behavior in a democracy predict that 
politicians will fund the public goods preferred by majorities at a 
level that satisfies the median voter.  Public good production by the 
state is subject to a so-called majoritarian constraint and limited by 
preference of the median voter, who sits in the middle of the polit-
ical spectrum.  Public goods preferred only by a minority . . . dem-
ocratically elected politicians will not support.72 
                                                          
 65.  Address to the Nation on the Program for Economic Recovery, 1 PUB. PAPERS 836 (Sept. 
24, 1981).  
 66.  SALAMON, supra note 55, at 1–2. 
 67.  Id. at 73.  Estimates differ, but at least one study suggests that the United States would need 
to provide private giving of at least 5.4% to 13.3% of GDP to bridge the gap between U.S. govern-
mental spending on public welfare and the spending of other developed countries.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 72.  
 69.  Id. at 72, 73. 
 70.  See TOMPKINS-STANGE, supra note 21, at 130 (“[E]ven in a well-functioning democracy, 
the state is constrained by the median voter and often fails to serve minority preferences that fall 
outside of majority interests.”). 
 71.  SALAMON, supra note 55, at 18. 
 72.  PHILANTHROPY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES 74 (Rob Reich et al. eds., 2016).  
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To the extent the critics are correct, any social welfare program blessed by 
the majority of Americans might overlook the specific needs of minority pop-
ulations.73  Thus, even in the face of a funding shortfall, some might justifi-
ably argue that our democratic society demands a robust private role in the 
provision of social welfare.74 
The problem with this argument, as set out in Part II, is that any social 
welfare regime that lacks democracy, similar to the current American philan-
thropic regime, will bring unintended consequences and aggravate other in-
herent negatives of philanthropy.  As Part II illustrates, the antidemocratic 
nature of philanthropy exacerbates both the paternalistic nature of philan-
thropy and the amateuristic impulses of philanthropists.  The result of this 
mixture threatens to undermine the good intentions of philanthropists and 
calls into question any undue reliance upon philanthropy to provide effective 
social welfare. 
II.  CRITIQUING PHILANTHROPY: HATING APPLE PIE AND KICKING PUPPIES 
There is a long-held and healthy suspicion of philanthropy in America.  
Many critiques suggest the philanthropic largesse of the wealthy is, counter-
intuitively, driven by selfishness.  For example, some charge that philan-
thropy is simply a way for the wealthy to mollify the less fortunate.75  As 
noted by Professor Deborah Weissman, the apparent generosity of a wealthy 
person engaging in philanthropy is actually a self-serving attempt to maintain 
power and wealth.76  Weissman argued that philanthropy is simply “a means 
to blunt the protests of the poor and to deter efforts to seek redistribution of 
wealth and power.”77  Thus, philanthropy’s veneer of altruism cloaks the 
wealthy’s true intent: to maintain status quo.  Elaborating on this argument, 
Weissman noted: 
Private philanthropy is a poor alternative to progressive taxation 
schemes and redistributive transfer payments.  Philanthropy cele-
brates the virtues of private giving as altruistic and patriotic, even 
as it acts to foreclose taxation and the development of adequate 
public policies which would establish humanitarian relief based on 
a firm set of institutional principles.78 
                                                          
 73.  Id. 
 74.  SALAMON, supra note 55, at 18 (charitable “organizations allow groups of individuals to 
pool their resources voluntarily to produce collective goods they mutually desire or find it important 
to provide but cannot convince a sufficient majority of their countrymen, or those in positions of 
power, to support”).  
 75.  Deborah M. Weissman, Law as Largess: Shifting Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 737, 803 (2002). 
 76.  Id. at 804.  This phenomenon, Weissman noted, “has been chronicled by both scholars and 
ethicists.”  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 805.  
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According to this argument, philanthropy’s very existence relies upon a 
system of taxation and wealth distribution that rewards the wealthy and fails 
to provide funds necessary for an adequate social welfare system.  Under this 
view, philanthropy is nothing more than a self-serving attempt to maintain an 
inherently unfair system. 
This Article does not quibble with such critiques—Weissman’s obser-
vations are both compelling and troubling.  However, even if we do not as-
sume selfish motivations for philanthropic activities, philanthropy has funda-
mental negative aspects that deserve examination.  Thus, this Article focuses 
on those critiques of philanthropy that do not impugn the motivations of the 
philanthropist.  In this manner, this Article offers critiques of philanthropy 
that explain why we should be wary of even well-intentioned philanthropy. 
However, before delving into these critiques, it is important to state what 
might no longer be obvious: Philanthropy is largely a positive force in the 
world.  This Article is not intended to serve as a manifesto against the sub-
jective benevolence of the wealthy.79  Whether driven by an altruistic instinct 
to address intractable problems, the sense of joy felt when personal wealth 
can be leveraged to ameliorate social ills, or a feeling of responsibility born 
from having enjoyed financial success while so many people struggle, the 
instinct to spend one’s wealth in a socially productive manner is an admirable 
reaction—one that should be fostered.  Because of this, criticizing the chari-
table efforts of the wealthy is strikingly counterintuitive.  Or as Professor 
Robin Rogers more colorfully stated, critics of philanthropy might be labeled 
“lunatics who oppose goodness and reason, probably hate apple pie, and 
maybe kick puppies.”80  One assumes we would prefer a wealthy person to 
donate money to address general societal ills rather than spend it on private 
and selfish ends.81  In defending the activities of modern philanthropists, Ber-
nard Marcus, the founder of Home Depot, argued, “All this money is going 
for charity to help people—what kind of numbskull would find something 
                                                          
 79.  The distrust of subjective benevolence has deep roots, but was perhaps best encapsulated 
by Theodore Roosevelt’s observation that “[n]o amount of charities in spending such fortunes . . . 
can compensate in any way for the misconduct in acquiring them.”  PHILANTHROPY IN 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES, supra note 72, at 64.  If one is looking for a manifesto, there is little 
shortage of such works, but if the reader has time for only one, the Author recommends Oscar 
Wilde’s The Soul of Man Under Socialism, which argued “[i]t is immoral to use private property in 
order to alleviate the horrible evils that result from the institution of private property.  It is both 
immoral and unfair.”  OSCAR WILDE, THE SOUL OF MAN UNDER SOCIALISM 10 (London, Porcu-
pine Press 1948) (1891).  
 80.  Robin Rogers, Why Philanthro-Policymaking Matters, 48 SOC’Y 376, 379 (2011); see also 
TOMPKINS-STANGE, supra note 21, at 147 (“[C]ritiques of philanthropic involvement in policy have 
often been expressed using hyperbole, and even the remarks of leading thinkers sometimes tend 
toward rhetoric of a sensational nature and may be dismissed as partisan or radical as opposed to 
constructive.”). 
 81.  PHILANTHROPY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES, supra note 72, at 67 (“Conspicuous consump-
tion by the wealthy is hard to see as preferable to the establishment of a foundation.”). 
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wrong with that?”82  So, are philanthropy’s critics numbskulls that hate apple 
pie and kick puppies? 
The answer is not as obvious as Marcus suggests.  Indeed, it is a com-
plex problem that demands a nuanced approach.  Unfortunately, the philan-
thropy debate currently enjoys a severe deficit of nuance.  As David Callahan 
noted, “Cheerleaders for philanthropy see nearly everything the givers do as 
positive, while critics can be just as myopic and, at times, paranoid.”83  Suf-
fice it to say that however credible the criticisms of philanthropy may be,84 
there is little doubt that philanthropy has many successes.  Philanthropy has 
significantly helped ameliorate the effects of global disease,85 poverty,86 and 
natural disasters.87  And while it also resulted in a number of spectacular fail-
ures, it would be disingenuous to identify particular areas where philanthropy 
failed as evidence of philanthropy’s folly,88 as such criticisms often ignore 
the many victories of philanthropy.89  Obviously, evidence of particular phil-
anthropic failures is not proof that all such endeavors are destined to fail, just 
as pointing to success stories does not serve as a vindication of the entire 
philanthropic field.  Therefore, rather than focusing on outcomes, it behooves 
critics to examine the process by which philanthropy arrives at both its vic-
tories and its failures. 
                                                          
 82.  Stephanie Strom, Pledge to Give Away Fortunes Stirs Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/giving/11PLEDGE.html.  Marcus continued to ask if critics 
“[w]ould rather we bought yachts and built mansions?”  Id.; see also TOMPKINS-STANGE, supra 
note 21, at 148 (“There’s [sic] worse ways for rich people to spend their money than trying to im-
prove public education; we’re lucky that Bill Gates thinks education is important.”). 
 83.  DAVID CALLAHAN, THE GIVERS: WEALTH, POWER, AND PHILANTHROPY IN A NEW 
GILDED AGE 33 (2017). 
 84.  One must be careful not to overstate the amount of criticism.  Indeed, philanthropy is often 
conducted without much critical comment.  See TOMPKINS-STANGE, supra note 21, at 7 (noting that 
Warren Buffett’s $31 billion gift to the Gates Foundation “was described in the press using almost 
exclusively celebratory terms . . . with limited analysis of the implications of concentrating an un-
precedented amount of philanthropic wealth in a single foundation”).  
 85.  Kate Kelland, Malaria Eradication No Vague Aspiration, Says Gates, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 
2011, 8:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaria-gates-eradication-
idUSTRE79I06620111019 (discussing the bold claim by Mr. Gates that eradicating malaria is “a 
tough, ambitious goal that can be reached within the next few decades”). 
 86.  Jane Wales, Philanthropists Can’t Eradicate Global Poverty, but We Can Make a Start, 
GUARDIAN (May 12, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-net-
work/2016/may/12/philanthropy-global-poverty-development-finance-sdgs (“Philanthropies and 
those they support can play a catalytic role by seeding, testing and proving new models for devel-
opment financing.  By accessing capital markets, the funding mechanisms they invent can provide 
for efficiency and scale—and, perhaps, even the promise of sustainability.”). 
 87.  Megan O’Neil, A Decade Later, New Orleans Nonprofits Cite Gains, Yet Worry over the 
Future, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/A-Dec-
ade-Later-New-Orleans/232509 (describing a “burst of philanthropic dollars in New Orleans in the 
years after Hurricane Katrina and Rita”). 
 88.  David Bosworth, The Cultural Contradictions of Philanthrocapitalism, 48 SOC’Y 382, 386 
(2011) (noting that, with respect to education reform, “rarely has so much influence been granted 
to an institution whose actual track record has been so dismal”). 
 89.  See supra notes 85–87.  
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This Part discusses the antidemocratic, paternalistic, and amateuristic 
aspects of philanthropy.  To illustrate the antidemocratic aspects of philan-
thropy, Section A examines two case studies: public education reform in the 
United States and anti-malarial efforts in Africa.  Section B discusses the 
historical roots of the paternalistic aspects of philanthropic efforts, highlight-
ing the reticence of traditional philanthropy to engage in direct cash transfers 
as evidence of lingering paternalistic impulses.  Finally, Section C highlights 
the amateuristic aspects of philanthropy by again discussing the philanthropic 
efforts to reform U.S. public education. 
A.  Philanthropy Is Antidemocratic 
At its core, philanthropy is the unilateral decision of a wealthy person 
to spend money or resources to address a particular issue.  Philanthropy is 
therefore, by definition, undemocratic.90  Perhaps a couple dedicates $113 
million to build a park and performance space on a pier in the Hudson 
River.91  Or maybe a wealthy couple donates $40 million to a public univer-
sity to institute a nursing program92 or donates $50 million to help construct 
a new home for a museum in Los Angeles.93  These are all examples of phi-
lanthropy, and they all represent examples of laudable beneficence.  These 
are inarguably positive acts, but it is hard to ignore the lack of input from 
other voices.  Parks, nursing schools, and museums are worthy investments, 
but would the public make the same spending choices?  More to the point, if 
New York City were to happen upon $113 million, would the democratically 
elected representatives decide to build an extravagant floating park, as was 
championed by the Diller-von Furstenberg Family Foundation, or are there 
more pressing public needs?94 
                                                          
 90.  DALE RUSSAKOFF, THE PRIZE: WHO’S IN CHARGE OF AMERICA’S SCHOOLS? 65 (2015) 
(“Almost all philanthropy is by definition undemocratic, its priorities set by wealthy donors and 
boards of trustees, who by extension can shape the direction of public policy in faraway communi-
ties.”).  
 91.  This example loosely describes the Diller-von Furstenberg Family Foundation’s donation 
of $113 million to the Hudson River Park Trust to create a new greenway and performance space 
in New York City.  See Lisa W. Foderaro, How Diller and von Furstenberg Got Their Island in 
Hudson River Park, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/nyre-
gion/how-diller-and-von-furstenberg-got-their-island-in-hudson-river-park.html. 
 92.  This example refers to Sue and Bill Gross’s donation to the University of California Irvine 
nursing school.  See Rebecca Plevin, UC Irvine Lands $40m Gift to Open Nursing School, S. CAL. 
PUB. RADIO (Jan. 14, 2016), www.scpr.org/news/2016/01/14/56861/uc-irvine-lands-40m-gift-to-
open-nursing-school/. 
 93.  This example refers to Elaine Wynn’s donation to the Los Angeles County Museum of Art.  
See David Ng, LACMA Receives a Historic $75-Million Windfall, Creating an Energetic and Hope-
Filled Momentum, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2016), www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/la-et-cm-
lacma-donation-20160428-story.html. 
 94.  Foderaro, supra note 91.  Even if the funds were limited to park development, there is a 
question about whether this is the best use of the funds.  As the executive director of the Greenwich 
Village Society for Historic Preservation noted, “[I]t does seem a little curious that there’s this vast 
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The natural response to such concerns is to remind critics that the money 
is the property of the wealthy individuals.  They are, therefore, justified in 
spending it however they like.  After we extract taxes, the public has no right 
to tell anyone how to spend their money.  Imagine, for example, there was a 
public consensus in the belief that luxury cars were a waste of money.  Even 
if this were true, the public does not have the right to force a wealthy person 
to buy a used Volvo rather than a brand new Mercedes.  This is the uncon-
troversial and necessary result of enforcing private property rights.  Given 
the strong public interest in private property rights, there is no obvious, jus-
tifiable reason for the general public to tell the wealthy how to spend their 
money.  A wealthy person’s decision that some amount of money is expend-
able does not automatically give the public a voice in how that money ought 
to be spent. 
This deference to a person’s freedom to spend money how they please 
has intuitive appeal and is based in America’s “deep-seated” reverence for 
“individualism.”95  Such deference is only justified, however, if the conse-
quences of the wealthy person’s spending are limited.  The combination of 
such far-reaching influence and the lack of public input is why philanthropy’s 
inherent lack of democracy is troubling.96 
This is not a new argument.  Over a century ago, Jane Addams lam-
basted the practice of philanthropy as incongruent with a democratic soci-
ety.97  Addams’s critique, forcefully argued in Democracy and Social Ethics, 
was not with the targets and means of philanthropy, but its very existence.98  
Regardless of the outcome of a philanthropic endeavor (for example, housing 
the homeless, feeding the hungry, or curing the sick), Addams objected to 
any institution in which an elite cadre of rich people wielded its wealth with-
out the input of the beneficiaries.99  Addams is not alone in this view.  Law-
makers in the early 1900s echoed this concern, perhaps best exemplified by 
the following statement of Congressman Frank Walsh: 
Even if the great charitable and philanthropic trusts should confine 
their work to the field of science, where temperament, point of 
                                                          
pool of largely private—but also public—money for this addition to the park . . . .  How can we 
claim that there is not private or public money for completing the parts of the park that need to be 
done?”  Id. 
 95.  SALAMON, supra note 55, at 1. 
 96.  PHILANTHROPY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES, supra note 72, at 72 (“[W]hy, in a democracy, 
should the size of one’s wallet give a person a greater say in the public good . . . .”).  
 97.  JANE ADDAMS, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL ETHICS 14 (1905) (“[T]he very need and exist-
ence of charity[] denies us the consolation and freedom which democracy will at last give.”); see 
also TOMPKINS-STANGE, supra note 21, at 10 (“Historically, Americans have been wary of foun-
dations’ use of private wealth to advance ideas that impact the broader public, without the account-
ability provided by formal democratic processes.”). 
 98.  See ADDAMS, supra note 97, at 12.  
 99.  See id. at 19–22. 
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view, and economic theory cannot enter,100 many of us should still 
feel that this was work for the state, and that, even in the power to 
do good, no one man, or group of men, should hold the monop-
oly.101 
More recently, Dr. Susan Ostrander bemoaned the emergence of donor-
centered philanthropy for similar reasons, noting that a focus on the pet in-
terests or hobbies of a specific donor makes it less likely philanthropic efforts 
are consistent with public needs.102 
These concerns derive from the fact that philanthropic spending on pub-
lic matters is not the same as spending money on private matters.  Philan-
thropic spending often involves matters of public interest.  A wealthy person 
spending millions of dollars on luxury goods does not directly affect the gen-
eral public, but the same thing cannot be said when a wealthy person spends 
millions of dollars to reform public education.103  This type of spending has 
a palpable effect on the general public.  To comprehend the problem, consider 
the decisions made by such a philanthropist.  In what state, city, or neighbor-
hood will the money be spent?  Should the money go to teacher salaries or 
infrastructure?  Should it buy computers or improve school meals?  Should it 
bolster STEM education or the arts?  These questions make it clear that 
spending money on public education touches on a number of issues that rea-
sonably fall in the public realm.  When the wealthy wield their dollars in an 
effort to transform the public realm, the absence of the public’s voice rings 
loudly.104 
                                                          
 100.  One does not often have the occasion to romanticize politics of the early twentieth century, 
but given the current debates surrounding climate change, one longs for a time when a member of 
Congress could conclusively state that science is a realm where neither “temperament” nor “point 
of view” is relevant. 
 101.  Frank P. Walsh, Perilous Philanthropy, 83 INDEP. 262, 262 (1915).  
 102.  Susan A. Ostrander, The Growth of Donor Control: Revisiting the Social Relations of Phi-
lanthropy, 36 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 356, 358 (2007). 
 103.  See infra notes 205–214 and accompanying text. 
 104. PHILANTHROPY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES, supra note 72, at 70 (“[F]oundations are not 
simply exercises in personal liberty.”) 
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1.  Philanthropy-Driven Education Reform 
Examining philanthropy-driven education reform is informative be-
cause public education is a particularly attractive target for philanthropic ef-
forts.105  Many of the largest and most influential philanthropic entities, in-
cluding the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (“Gates Foundation”),106 the 
Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation (“Broad Foundation”),107 and the Walton 
Family Foundation,108 spend great amounts of time and money attempting to 
reform our public education system.  Thus, it is no surprise one of the CZI’s 
first targets also involves reforming public education by focusing on person-
alized learning.109 
To the extent philanthropic attention is a reflection of societal im-
portance, the focus on public education makes sense.  As the primary means 
by which we nurture future generations, our continued economic growth and 
future cultural contributions depend upon a robust public education system.  
For these reasons, public education is a quintessential public concern.110  Vir-
                                                          
 105.  Dale Russakoff recounted some of philanthropy’s contributions to public education in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: 
The education of the poorest Americans has been a cause of the wealthiest since Recon-
struction, when Northern industrialists built schools of varying caliber across the South 
for former slaves.  Henry Ford created the Ford English School in 1913 to teach “basic 
reading and speaking comprehension skills” to mostly foreign-born factory workers.  
Early in the twentieth century, Andrew Carnegie’s foundation developed the “Carnegie 
unit,” or the credit hour, which became the currency of learning: [T]o graduate from high 
school, students still must earn a certain number of credits, based not on what they have 
learned, but on time spent in classes. 
RUSSAKOFF, supra note 90, at 7.  Public education remains a primary focus of philanthropic efforts 
to this day.  See TOMPKINS-STANGE, supra note 21, at 17 (“Arguably, no social sector in the United 
States is more heavily impacted by foundations than K–12 education.  Foundation funding to edu-
cation has nearly quadrupled during the last three decades, representing a significant infusion of 
capital.”). 
 106.  See What We Do: K–12 Education Strategy Overview, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., 
www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/US-Program/K-12-Education (last visited Dec. 11, 2017). 
 107.  See Education, ELI & EDYTHE BROAD FOUND., https://broadfoundation.org/education/ 
(last visited May 3, 2018) (highlighting over $589 million invested in education efforts since 1999). 
 108.  See WALTON FAMILY FOUND., 2020 K–12 EDUCATION STRATEGIC PLAN 3,  
https://www.waltonfamilyfoundation.org/our-work/k-12-education.  
 109.  See Initiatives, CHAN ZUCKERBERG INITIATIVE, https://www.chanzuckerberg.com/initia-
tives (last visited May 3, 2018) (“The Chan Zuckerberg Initiative believes that every child should 
enter adulthood able to recognize and realize their full potential.  This means that by age 21, every-
one should be able to earn a living wage, build independence, and identify and pursue their passions.  
We believe a whole child approach to personalized learning—focused on and led by the learner—
is the most promising way to achieve this vision.”); see also College Board, CZI Announce Part-
nership on Personalized Learning, PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIG. (May 17, 2017), https://philanthro-
pynewsdigest.org/news/college-board-czi-announce-partnership-on-personalized-learning.  
 110.  Jeffrey A. Raffel, Why Has Public Administration Ignored Public Education, and Does it 
Matter?, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 135, 135 (2007) (noting that public education “accounts for one-
quarter of state and local governmental spending in the United States, represents one-third of total 
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tually every aspect of modern American life is touched by our public educa-
tion system.  Even if one were to set aside the staggering number of people 
employed by public education systems across the country111 and ignore par-
ents of children in public schools, one certainly employs a product of the 
public school system or has a consumer base substantially made up of public 
school system graduates.112  It is one of the rare institutions that manages to 
infiltrate virtually every aspect of our society.  Despite this ubiquity, the 
United States’ public education system is below average and is lagging be-
hind the public school systems of many other nations.113  The combination of 
the importance of our public school system and its intolerably mediocre state 
makes it a popular target for philanthropic efforts.114 
Piquing the interest of the wealthy should not automatically raise 
alarms.  The problem is not that a few civic-minded individuals are interested 
in addressing the problems plaguing America’s public education system.  Ra-
ther, the problem is that these philanthropists are not interested in small ges-
tures.  If they were simply providing school supplies or funding field trips, 
there would be little cause for concern.  But these philanthropists aim to re-
define the very nature of public education, and their collective financial clout 
has resulted in an outsized influence.  Indeed, the influence is so large that 
almost all voices are drowned out by the message of the philanthropists and, 
as a result, a small number of voices have dictated the discussion and imple-
mentation of education reform.115 
Take, for example, the Gates Foundation’s effort to break up larger high 
schools.116  This was the Gates Foundation’s “first major education effort,” 
                                                          
government employment in the nation, and is consistently rated by citizens as their highest prior-
ity”). 
 111.  The number is difficult to obtain, but the National Center for Education Statistics projected 
3,141,000 teachers in public elementary and secondary schools in 2017.  NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATS., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, tbl. 105.40 (2016), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/di-
gest/d15/tables/dt15_105.40.asp. 
 112.  The vast majority of children attend public schools.  See Fast Facts, Public and Private 
School Comparison, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/dis-
play.asp?id=55 (“In 2015, private school students made up 10.3 [%] of all elementary and secondary 
school students.”). 
 113.  The United States ranks below average in math (thirty-ninth) and slightly above average 
in reading (twenty-third) and science (twenty-fifth) in the OECD’s global rankings on student per-
formance in mathematics, reading, and science through the Program for International Student As-
sessment.  Abby Jackson & Andy Kiersz, The Latest Ranking of Top Countries in Math, Reading, 
and Science Is Out—and the U.S. Didn’t Crack the Top 10, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 6, 2016), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/pisa-worldwide-ranking-of-math-science-reading-skills-2016-12.  
 114.  See supra note 105. 
 115.  Michael Klonsky, Power Philanthropy: Taking the Public Out of Public Education, in THE 
GATES FOUNDATION AND THE FUTURE OF U.S. “PUBLIC” SCHOOLS 21, 21 (Philip E. Kovacs ed., 
2011). 
 116.  Edward Skloot, The Gated Community, ALLIANCE MAG. (Sept. 1, 2011), https://www.hud-
son.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1197/alliance_magazine_edward_skloot.pdf; see 
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where it “granted $1.3 billion to redesign large comprehensive high schools 
and create smaller learning communities.”117  Without any definitive evi-
dence that this effort would result in better student outcomes, and without 
soliciting input from administrators, teachers, or students in the targeted 
schools, the Gates Foundation leveraged its investment to position its small 
schools initiative as “a cornerstone of thinking in the minds of many educa-
tional reformers, planners and administrators.”118  The result of this invest-
ment was “the establishment of more than 2,600 schools in 45 states and the 
District of Columbia, reaching well over 750,000 students.”119 
Unfortunately, the effort did not result in much success, with Mr. Gates 
admitting the program “did not improve students’ achievement in any signif-
icant way.”120  Faced with this lack of progress, the Gates Foundation aban-
doned the project, leaving “school districts . . . with costlier-to-run small 
schools.”121  Thus, a philanthropist conceived and implemented an ineffec-
tive education reform effort that affected three-quarters of a million students 
without the input, blessing, or counsel of the affected population.  This dis-
ruption of student lives is troubling, but the powerlessness of the affected 
population may be more disturbing.  Ignore, for a moment, the ineffective-
ness of the initiative, and instead recognize the disconcerting lack of democ-
racy in an endeavor that affected 750,000 children. 
Perhaps this antidemocratic process would be more palatable if the in-
fluence were more limited.  If the Gates Foundation founded and completely 
funded a private school for the wealthy, for example, the cries for public in-
volvement would not carry much weight.  This would be, to continue the 
metaphor, analogous to a wealthy person’s decision to purchase a Mercedes 
rather than a used Volvo.  When a person purchases a vehicle for their own 
use, the public has no justified right to exert influence over the decision.  The 
unilateral nature of this decision is not problematic because it does not di-
rectly implicate the public interest.  The philanthropic impact on public edu-
cation is not, however, the same as a rich person buying a Mercedes, and this 
is not akin to the wealthy creating a school for their children.  Rather, it is an 
attempt to transform all schools.  Thus, a more accurate metaphor would be 
a rich person telling every less wealthy person to buy a Mercedes rather than 
a used Volvo because the wealthy person has contributed $1,000 toward the 
                                                          
also Gara LaMarche, Is Philanthropy Bad for Democracy?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 30, 2014), www.theat-
lantic.com/politics/archive/2014/10/is-philanthropy-good-for-democracy/381996/. 
 117.  TOMPKINS-STANGE, supra note 21, at 21. 
 118.  Skloot, supra note 116. 
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Annual Letter 2009, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND. (Jan. 2009), www.gatesfounda-
tion.org/Who-We-Are/Resources-and-Media/Annual-Letters-List/Annual-Letter-2009. 
 121.  Gates Foundation Failures Show Philanthropists Shouldn’t Be Setting America’s Public 
School Agenda, L.A. TIMES (June 1, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-gates-
education-20160601-snap-story.html [hereinafter Gates Foundation Failures]. 
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purchase price.  The problem is not the fact that a rich person is providing 
$1,000.  Rather, the issue is that the rich person believes this minor invest-
ment gives them the right to dictate which car is bought. 
Make no mistake, the investment is minor.  The philanthropic domina-
tion of the educational reform effort has come at a relatively low cost to the 
philanthropists involved.122  When compared to public contributions to pub-
lic education, philanthropists have invested a remarkably small amount.123  
By one measure, the collective investment of the Gates Foundation, the 
Broad Foundation, and the Walton Family Foundation in education reform 
amounts to “less than [1%] of the monies spent each year on public educa-
tion.”124  The balance, of course, is from tax revenue.  Even though the phil-
anthropic contribution to public education is a “relatively tiny investment,” 
it drives the bulk of public education reform discussions and represents an 
unnaturally outsized influence on the education of our children.125  As Pro-
fessor David Bosworth bemoaned, “The practical effect [of philanthropy’s 
influence on public education] will be the technocratic elimination of local 
control over public schools . . . without any real concern as to the impact on 
democratic initiative.”126  While “[t]he public . . . pays most of the bills,” 
Bosworth pointed out that “the philanthrocapitalist . . . sets the agenda.”127  
Bosworth is not alone in his criticisms.  The modern philanthropic efforts to 
reform education “have been routinely criticized for their top-down approach 
and outsize influence in advancing specific reform agendas.”128  This “top-
down approach” often ignores the desires or voices of the population most 
affected by the philanthropic policymaking.129  The result is a troubling def-
icit of democracy. 
The success of this influence is evident in the fact that philanthropists 
have convinced “federal and state policymakers to adopt many elements of 
                                                          
 122.  See PHILANTHROPY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES, supra note 72, at 233 (“The amount of 
money contributed by philanthropists to public goods—scientific research, K-12 education, or so-
cial services, for example—is small in comparison to the money provided by the state.”). 
 123.  TOMPKINS-STANGE, supra note 21, at 60 (noting that the Gates Foundation’s “funding 
accounted for one-third of the $1.5 billion annual education philanthropy in the United States, which 
in turn paled in contrast to the $500 billion public education budget”). 
 124.  Bosworth, supra note 88, at 384–85. 
 125.  Id.; see also TOMPKINS-STANGE, supra note 21, at 82 (quoting a Gates Foundation official 
who noted that the Foundation’s investment in public education “greatly affected how some of the 
early Obama education initiatives were formulated and implemented”). 
 126.  Bosworth, supra note 88, at 385. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Kyoko Uchida, Policy Patrons: Philanthropy, Education Reform, and the Politics of Influ-
ence, PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIG. (June 16, 2016), http://philanthropynewsdigest.org/off-the-
shelf/policy-patrons-philanthropy-education-reform-and-the-politics-of-influence. 
 129.  See id. (“Unfortunately, the [philanthropic approach to education reform], despite its em-
phasis on metrics and accountability, is often seen as not being accountable to low-income families 
of color who are directly affected by the education reforms championed by the foundations . . . .”). 
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their reform agenda”130 with a push for “charter schools, standardized testing, 
national curricula, merit pay for teachers, reorganizing or closing underper-
forming schools, developing accurate data in and across funding sites, and 
improved management.”131  Some of these efforts may prove fruitful, while 
others may prove to be misfires.  For purposes of this discussion, the outcome 
is not important.  Rather, it is important to note that the targets of this philan-
thropic policymaking—administrators, teachers, students, and students’ fam-
ilies—do not have any meaningful input on these “philanthropically driven 
educational experiments.”132 
The lack of democracy in the modern philanthropic approach to public 
education is different from previous endeavors only in its intensity.  As Pro-
fessor Stanley N. Katz argued, “Foundations have always been accused of 
arrogance, but this generation of funders carries arrogance to new levels, pro-
moting policy objectives that in many cases clearly oppose local public opin-
ion.”133  Even in the face of such clear opposition, there is no recourse for the 
public.  Unlike with public institutions, the general public has no mechanism 
for registering complaints, and the leaders of private foundations are not sub-
ject to election.134  Foundation leaders “don’t have to run for office, or satisfy 
shareholders, or attract customers, or win popularity contests,”135 and funders 
of foundations cannot be fired.136  This dynamic means that many members 
of the public who are negatively affected by philanthropic efforts have little 
choice other than to suffer quietly.137 
There is a chance that the philanthropically driven reforms may prove 
to be the elusive solution to our public education woes.  There is no reason 
to doubt that the Gates Foundation, the Broad Foundation, and the Walton 
Family Foundation earnestly believe they have identified ways to improve 
                                                          
 130.  Stanley N. Katz, Does Philanthropy Threaten Democracy?, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 
(2016), https://ssir.org/book_reviews/entry/does_philanthropy_threaten_democracy (reviewing 
Tompkins-Stange’s book Policy Patrons).  
 131.  Skloot, supra note 116 (noting that these are the “new silver bullets” for philanthropists). 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Katz, supra note 130. 
 134.  TOMPKINS-STANGE, supra note 21, at 12 (“Since their earliest origins, foundations have 
been consistently criticized for their involvement in policy matters and viewed with suspicion as 
potential sites of dissident power wielded by unelected elites.”). 
 135.  LaMarche, supra note 116.  
 136.  See CALLAHAN, supra note 83, at 133 (“Eli Broad put the point this way: ‘Neither Bill 
Gates nor I have to worry about getting fired.  We take big risks in pursuit of big rewards.’”). 
 137.  It is important to note, however, that when philanthropists enlist public officials to further 
a philanthropic agenda, there is an opportunity for the public to voice objections at the next election.  
However, this meager amount of political power cannot serve as a check against philanthropic in-
fluence for three reasons: first, an election can only retrospectively punish political officials from 
engaging in antidemocratic activity (as opposed to voicing concerns before the philanthropic agenda 
is implemented); second, it is politically difficult to reject philanthropic investment in underinvested 
areas of concern; and third, election results may be influenced by any number of additional factors, 
and it is, therefore, nearly impossible for voters to send a message on a single issue. 
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our public education system.  The problem is not that philanthropists are 
wrong (or may one day be proven wrong), but rather that the philanthropists 
become the only meaningful voice in the debate.  Again, this Article is less 
concerned with outcomes and more focused on process.  A small group of 
wealthy individuals dominated the public education reform discussion, de-
termined the appropriate solutions, and started implementation.  Regardless 
of the results, this is a profoundly antidemocratic means of addressing a so-
cial problem.138 
2.  Philanthropy-Driven Antimalarial Efforts 
If philanthropic influence were limited to public education, perhaps our 
society could prepare a proper response.  Indeed, one can point to a number 
of dissenting voices to the philanthropy-driven public education reform.139  
In addition to the scholars and critics cited in the previous Section, some pol-
iticians,140 teachers’ unions,141 and parents142 have expressed displeasure at 
many public education reform proposals.  Although they have yet to stem the 
influence of philanthropists in education reforms, they have been instrumen-
tal in publicizing some of the negative effects of philanthropy-driven 
measures.143  However, this is not a war fought on a single front.  Similar 
antidemocratic approaches are repeated in virtually every area in which phil-
anthropic dollars are spent. 
Take, for example, antimalarial efforts.  Like public education, malaria 
captured the attention of many philanthropic efforts.  Most notably, the Gates 
Foundation targeted malaria as one of its first priorities, and the results are 
impressive.  According to a joint report by the World Health Organization 
(“WHO”) and the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
(“UNICEF”), “Malaria death rates have plunged by 60% since 2000, trans-
lating into 6.2 million lives saved.”144 
                                                          
 138.  See Gates Foundation Failures, supra note 121 (“Philanthropists are not generally educa-
tion experts, and even if they hire scholars and experts, public officials shouldn’t be allowing them 
to set the policy agenda for the nation’s public schools.”). 
 139.  See generally RUSSAKOFF, supra note 90. 
 140.  Id. at 207 (noting that Shavar Jeffries, a candidate for mayor of Newark, “was harshly 
critical of [the reformers’] approach”). 
 141.  Id. at 178 (noting that union efforts fiercely opposed reform-led school closings). 
 142.  Id. (noting that parents spoke out against school closings out of a fear “that children whose 
schools were closing would have to walk through gang-ruled territory or cross highly trafficked 
thoroughfares to reach their reassigned schools”). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Press Release, WHO/UNICEF, WHO/UNICEF Report: Malaria MDG Target Achieved 
Amid Sharp Drop in Cases and Mortality, but 3 Billion People Remain at Risk (Sept. 17, 2015), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2015/malaria-mdg-target/en/. 
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We can attribute this success largely to the Gates Foundation.  Prior to 
its efforts, very little was spent on malaria research.145  Malaria is a disease 
that largely affects the global poor, and there was, therefore, little market 
incentive for drug companies to engage in antimalarial research.146  As Mr. 
Gates noted at the Global Grand Challenges Summit in 2013, malaria re-
search “gets virtually no funding” because the for-profit nature of most med-
ical research emphasizes an incentive structure that prioritizes male baldness 
treatments and erectile dysfunction medication over life-saving medicines.147  
Recognizing this market failure, the Gates Foundation identified malaria as 
a focus of its philanthropic efforts.148  Since that decision, there has been a 
dramatic shift in funding from governments and other private foundations.149  
Thanks largely to the Gates Foundation’s focus on malaria, researchers can 
credibly claim that malaria might be completely eradicated by 2040.150 
This is a stunning accomplishment.  The effect of the Gates Founda-
tion’s focus on malaria is difficult to overstate and is rightfully lauded.  There 
is no meaningful way to calculate the positive effect of saving 6.2 million 
lives.  By stepping in when the market failed to act, the Gates Foundation 
might credibly claim to eradicate a deadly disease that has ravaged poor 
countries and killed millions. 
Yet, if one focuses on the process as opposed to the results (however 
praiseworthy and commendable), the philanthropy-driven antimalarial effort 
smacks of antidemocracy and may have resulted in some unintended negative 
                                                          
 145.  Kirstin RW Matthews & Vivian Ho, The Grand Impact of the Gates Foundation. Sixty 
Billion Dollars and One Famous Person Can Affect the Spending and Research Focus of Public 
Agencies, 9 EMBO REP. 409, 411 (2008), www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2373372/ (not-
ing that “research on vaccines against malaria and tuberculosis increased by 96% and 62%” between 
2003 and 2008, and that “this sudden interest and financial support for global health research at the 
NIH was largely due to the [Gates Foundation], and its strong outreach to both the scientific com-
munity and the public”). 
 146.  To state the obvious, the global poor are not a viable market for any pharmaceutical com-
pany’s research and development investment.  See ADVANCES IN MALARIA RESEARCH 357(Deepak 
Gaur et al. eds., 2017) (“The discovery and development of new medicines against malaria repre-
sents a formidable challenge.  The lack of an obvious financial return on investment (the profits 
made by selling new medicines will not repay the development costs) is a good example of market 
failure.”). 
 147.  Olivia Solon, Bill Gates: Capitalism Means Male Baldness Research Gets More Funding 
Than Malaria, WIRED (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/bill-gates-capitalism.  Mr. 
Gates bemoaned that “if you are working on male baldness . . . you get an order of magnitude more 
research funding because of the voice in the marketplace.”  Id. 
 148.  See What We Do: Malaria Strategy Overview, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., 
https://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Health/Malaria (last visited July 22, 2018) 
(“Malaria is a top priority of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.”) 
 149.  See Matthews & Ho, supra note 145. 
 150.  See From Aspiration to Action: What Will It Take to End Malaria?, BILL & MELINDA 
GATES FOUND. & OFF. UN SEC’Y-GEN.’S SPECIAL ENVOY FOR FINANCING HEALTH MILLENNIUM 
DEV. GOALS & FOR MALARIA, http://endmalaria2040.org/ (last visited July 18, 2018).  
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consequences.  The immense influence of the philanthropists in public edu-
cation reform pales in comparison to the power wielded by the Gates Foun-
dation in antimalarial efforts.  The Gates Foundation is one of the largest 
contributors to the WHO.151  In fact, in 2014, the Gates Foundation contrib-
uted more than the United Kingdom, Canada, or the European Commis-
sion.152  As a major funder of the WHO, the primary policymaker in global 
health,153 the Gates Foundation has outsized influence on global health poli-
cymaking. 
This is more than a theoretical concern.  As a result of this influence, 
the Gates Foundation has dominated the malaria research field so thoroughly 
that it may have stifled contrary scientific opinions154 by disincentivizing in-
dependent assessments of Gates Foundation-funded research.155  More 
alarmingly, there is evidence that the Gates Foundation’s funding dominance 
convinces some countries to artificially prioritize malaria over other health-
related issues.156  This results in entire countries with deemphasized general 
public health systems in favor of the Gates Foundation’s prescribed interven-
tions for specific diseases, leaving communities vulnerable to a number of 
other threats.157 
                                                          
 151.  Kate Kelland, The World Health Organization’s Critical Challenge: Healing Itself, 
REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2016, 11:55 AM), www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/health-who-fu-
ture/ (“The largest of the non-government donors by a long way is the Bill & Melinda Gates Foun-
dation.  From a standing start a decade ago, it has been contributing between $250 million and $300 
million a year.  In one year—2013—it was the largest donor bar none, overtaking even total contri-
butions from the U.S. government.”). 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  See About WHO, WORLD HEALTH ORG., www.who.int/about-us (last visited June 28, 
2018) (“Our primary role is to direct and coordinate international health within the United Nations 
system.”). 
 154.  See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Gates Foundation’s Influence Criticized, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/16/science/16malaria.html (noting that “[m]any of the 
world’s leading malaria scientists are now ‘locked up in a “cartel” with their own research funding 
being linked to those of others within the group’” (quoting Dr. Arata Kochi, the WHO’s head of 
malaria research)). 
 155.  Id. (“Because ‘each has a vested interest to safeguard the work of the others’ . . . getting 
independent reviews of research proposals ‘is becoming increasingly difficult.’” (quoting Dr. Ko-
chi)). 
 156.  See What Has the Gates Foundation Done for Global Health?, 373 LANCET 1577, 1577 
(May 9, 2009), https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(09)60885-0.pdf 
(“In some countries, the valuable resources of the [Gates] Foundation are being wasted and diverted 
from more urgent needs.”). 
 157.  Dr. Margaret Chan, the head of the WHO, intimated that donor preferences might have 
contributed to the lack of an adequate response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, noting that 
the WHO’s “budget [is] highly earmarked” and driven by “donor interests.”  Sheri Fink, W.H.O. 
Leader Describes the Agency’s Ebola Operations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014) (alteration in origi-
nal), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/world/africa/who-leader-describes-the-agencys-ebola-
operations.html.  Donor preferences may also have played a role in raising the prices of vaccines.  
See Sarah Boseley, Bill Gates Dismisses Criticism of High Prices for Vaccines, GUARDIAN (Jan. 
27, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jan/27/bill-gates-dismisses-
criticism-of-high-prices-for-vaccines.  Médecins Sans Frontières noted the cost to “vaccinate a child 
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The negative consequences of a near myopic focus on malaria are evi-
dent in Liberia.  Liberia, one of the world’s poorest countries,158 receives a 
significant amount of philanthropic support earmarked for antimalarial ef-
forts.  In 2012, for example, Liberia received as much as $110 million from 
various philanthropic endeavors.159  Of that $110 million, 43% went to ma-
laria efforts, resulting in a troubling underfunding of general health pro-
grams.160  In one Liberian county, all residents could receive malaria treat-
ment, while only one-third were within an hour’s walk to a health clinic and 
just half had access to general health services.161 
Is this a good result?  Reasonable arguments can be made on both sides.  
On one hand, proponents of malaria treatment might point out that malaria 
eradication is within our grasp and the resulting prioritization over other 
health issues is justifiable.  On the other hand, one might argue that a focus 
on a single disease to the exclusion of other health issues is short-sighted, 
leaving countries vulnerable to other outbreaks and public health crises.162  
                                                          
is . . . [sixty-eight] times more expensive than it was in 2001, with many parts of the world unable 
to afford new high-priced vaccines like that against pneumococcal disease, which kills about one 
million children each year.”  MSF Calls on GSK and Pfizer to Slash Pneumo Vaccine Price to $5 
Per Child for Poor Countries, MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.doc-
torswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/news/msf-calls-gsk-and-pfizer-slash-pneumo-
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tured.  Thus, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (“GAVI”) collects funds from 
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system view the advance market commitment as a rational response to a market failure.  See Rachel 
Glennerster et al., Creating Markets for Vaccines, 1 INNOVATIONS 67 (2006).  Skeptics view the 
scheme as little more than subsidizing private pharmaceutical companies with aid dollars, with pro-
tests ranging in severity from a complaint that the pharmaceutical companies’ GAVI board seats 
represent a conflict of interest to charges that GAVI is overpricing vaccines.  Max Lawson, Vaccines 
Save Lives but Is GAVI Getting Value for Money?, FROM POVERTY TO POWER (June 13, 2011), 
https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/vaccines-save-lives-but-is-gavi-getting-value-for-money-guest-post-
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 160.  See id. (“[T]he country . . . had only eight hospital beds for every 10,000 people in 2012, 
versus 29 in the [United States] and [United Kingdom].”). 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Officials made such an argument with specific reference to many countries’ poor prepar-
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to fight ailments such as AIDS, malaria, and polio rather than supporting basic health services has 
left nations unprepared for epidemics like Ebola.”). 
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Both sides have valid arguments, and these are not easy decisions.  However, 
if the decision is not a foregone conclusion—that is, if both sides have cred-
ible arguments—it seems inappropriate to make the decision without the in-
put of the people most affected.  The absurdity of philanthropy is that the 
people of Liberia have less input regarding the medical priorities of their 
country than a handful of wealthy individuals living in the United States.163 
The costs of such a monopolizing influence over public health policy-
making must be considered.  If there is any credence to the criticisms dis-
cussed above, there appears to be a practical trade-off between eradicating 
malaria and shoring up systemic and institutional resilience to address a 
broad swath of health issues.  One wonders if the beneficiaries of the Gates 
Foundation’s efforts would have chosen to address malaria over, for exam-
ple, Ebola.  And this begs the question: How much influence should the ben-
eficiaries have?  Or, as Robin Rogers rhetorically asked, “Should the global 
rich have more power to determine social policy for the poor if they agree to 
pay for it?”164 
This is not a straightforward decision.  Again, this Article does not argue 
that philanthropic antimalarial efforts are causing more harm than good.  
Such a claim would be patently absurd (although, it was argued).165  Admit-
tedly, it is hard to muster outrage about the antidemocratic aspects of philan-
thropy when the result is the eradication of malaria.  However, there are more 
controversial goals of some philanthropists that might stir more concern.  As 
Callahan noted: 
Who doesn’t want to extinguish Alzheimer’s or malaria?  But oth-
ers are more controversial.  If you don’t favor same-sex marriage 
or charter schools or shutting down coal plants, you might not be 
too thrilled with how some billionaires have been deploying their 
money . . . .  In many ways, today’s new philanthropy is exciting 
and inspiring.  In other ways, it’s scary and feels profoundly un-
democratic.166 
Rather than litigate the pros and cons of malaria-focused philanthropy, 
it is important to simply recognize the inherent value in self-determination 
and democracy, and identify any current philanthropic practices that run con-
trary to those ideals.  In the current philanthropic system, a small group of 
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wealthy individuals have the power to unilaterally determine the public edu-
cation reform measures of American communities167 and the public health 
priorities of foreign countries.168  As individuals and private entities, philan-
thropists are not bound by the democratic process, and there is no meaningful 
way for the affected communities to determine how money is spent on their 
education or medical treatment.169  Regardless of the outcome, the lack of 
public input is a problem that should not be ignored. 
B.  Philanthropy Is Paternalistic 
One would hope we have evolved beyond the belief that wealth is evi-
dence of virtue.  This was a popular notion throughout history, particularly 
in nineteenth-century America when poverty was often viewed as nothing 
more than a symptom of vice or laziness.170  A person’s poverty was consid-
ered within their control; a person would be poor only if they suffered from 
a moral or spiritual deficiency.171  This belief suggested that by addressing a 
poor person’s alleged depraved character, society would remove the burden 
of poverty.172 
This view is epitomized in Andrew Carnegie’s article Wealth.  Carnegie 
wrote this article to encourage his wealthy peers to engage in philanthropy 
during their lifetimes, rather than leaving money to their children173 or dedi-
cating it to public purposes in their wills.174  Popularly known as The Gospel 
of Wealth, Carnegie’s article ultimately argues that giving in one’s lifetime 
is “the true antidote for the temporary unequal distribution of wealth, the rec-
onciliation of the rich and the poor.”175  Carnegie’s fervor for philanthropy 
bordered on the fanatical,176 stating: 
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Under [philanthropy’s] sway we shall have an ideal state, in which 
the surplus wealth of the few will become, in the best sense, the 
property of the many, because administered for the common good, 
and this wealth, passing through the hands of the few, can be made 
a much more potent force for the elevation of our race than if it had 
been distributed in small sums to the people themselves.177 
However enthusiastic, Carnegie’s influential article reeks of the pater-
nalism that continues to infect philanthropy today.  Carnegie was a true be-
liever that poverty is evidence of immorality, asserting that “[t]hose worthy 
of assistance, except in rare cases, seldom require assistance.”178  Following 
this logic, the poor’s unworthiness led Carnegie to believe they could not be 
trusted to make decisions on how charitable funds were spent.  If the nation’s 
wealthy were to give money to the poor, “[m]uch of this sum . . . would have 
been wasted in the indulgence of appetite, some of it in excess, and it may be 
doubted whether even the part put to the best use . . . would have yielded 
results.”179  As Carnegie dramatically concluded, “It were better for mankind 
that the millions of the rich were thrown into the sea than so spent as to en-
courage the slothful, the drunken, the unworthy.”180 
Following this conviction, early American charities dedicated to ame-
liorating the plight of the poor focused more on the person’s character than 
any direct efforts to change the person’s financial situation.  In this view, the 
problem was not a lack of jobs, but a deficit of spirituality; poverty was not 
caused by inadequate public education, but a shortage of civic responsibil-
ity.181  This line of thought was born out of the belief that a poor person would 
no longer suffer from poverty if the person would only address their lacking 
moral foundation.182 
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This is a rather unpopular belief today,183 and one would be hard-
pressed to find many charities explicitly espousing such a principle.  Alt-
hough this conviction is no longer openly embraced, the philanthropic sector 
betrays a lingering belief that a person’s poverty is related to their morality 
or work ethic.  Current charitable approaches to poverty amelioration appear 
to be a simple evolution of language rather than a change in approach.  Rather 
than referring to spiritual or moral deficiencies, “[t]he current discourse” uses 
“such terms as ‘dysfunctional,’ ‘anti-social,’ and ‘dependent personality dis-
order’ as new pathologies to implicate the poor in deviant behavior.”184 
This leads to the incorrect (and, frankly, offensive) assumption that if 
not for these pathological deficiencies, poor people would be successful and 
productive community members.  Thus, despite the assumed evolution in our 
collective understanding of the causes of poverty, there is little difference 
between the current approach and the historic belief that wealth is evidence 
of virtue and poverty an indication of moral failure.  As a result, modern 
philanthropic efforts, similar to historical efforts, are largely structured to ad-
dress the so-called pathologies, rather than the poverty itself.185  This is why 
“[n]oncontroversial poverty programs, such as food banks,” readily receive 
philanthropic support, where “grassroots organizations, advocacy initiatives, 
or public policy efforts” experience much more difficulty.186 
1.  “Why not cash?”187 
Echoing Carnegie’s warning that giving a “quarter-dollar” to a “beggar” 
results in the money being “spent improperly,”188 most philanthropists prefer 
in-kind gifts (that is, food, clothing, etc.) rather than monetary gifts.189  This 
preference is emblematic of the enduring paternalism of philanthropy.  If a 
person is homeless and destitute, logic dictates that the most direct means of 
ameliorating their situation is to provide money.  Would not the beneficiary 
be in the best position to select appropriate food and shelter? 
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The intuitive preference for direct cash transfers is supported by con-
vincing data.190  In a study of the rural poor in Mexico comparing in-kind and 
cash transfers, researchers learned that there was no discernable difference 
between the two programs in terms of improvements in health, while direct 
cash transfers were markedly more efficient.191  The study noted that “house-
holds spend very little of the cash transfer on vices” and there was no evi-
dence that less food was consumed when people in poverty received cash 
rather than food.192  Thus, contrary to Carnegie’s assumption, studies prove 
that recipients of direct cash transfers are quite responsible with the dona-
tions.193  Perhaps more importantly, the cost of the cash transfer programs is 
significantly less expensive than in-kind programs,194 with one study sug-
gesting that a philanthropic shift from in-kind donations to cash transfers 
would help 18% more people.195 
Despite this evidence, direct cash transfers represent only 6% of human-
itarian aid.196  There is little reason for any loyalty to in-kind programs other 
than the tradition of paternalism and lingering distrust of those in poverty.197  
As one supporter of direct cash transfers noted, “The aid sector in general is 
bad at trusting people and reluctant to hand-over power and control.  [Philan-
thropy is] fundamentally premised on the idea of the external experts decid-
ing what is needed and providing it.”198  The following anecdote might best 
encapsulate this distrust of beneficiaries to make responsible decisions.  
When Jacquelline Fuller, Director of Giving at Google, recommended giving 
direct cash transfers to people in extreme poverty in East Africa, one of her 
superiors responded, “You must be smoking crack.”199 
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The preference for in-kind assistance and the resistance to direct cash 
transfers is not only less efficient, it robs beneficiaries of their dignity and 
self-determination.200  It results in wealthy people choosing the type of food 
a poor person eats, the type of housing in which a poor person lives, and the 
type of jobs for which a poor person receives training.  Alternatively, cash 
transfers give recipients both “greater choice and control over how best to 
meet their own needs, and a greater sense of dignity.”201  Thus, philanthro-
pists miss an opportunity to “align the humanitarian system better with what 
people need, rather than what humanitarian [organizations] are mandated and 
equipped to provide.”202 
Despite the effectiveness of direct cash transfers and the attendant ben-
efit of increasing the dignity of beneficiaries, the usual means of philan-
thropic efforts to address poverty reflect the persistent paternalistic nature of 
philanthropy.  Rather than provide the financial means to remedy the person’s 
situation, philanthropy chooses which food, shelter, and job training to pro-
vide.  The thinly veiled assumption is that the rich cannot trust the poor to 
spend money in a responsible manner.  Philanthropists believe they know 
what is best for the poor and will therefore spend money on their behalf. 
2.  “We know what works”203 
The reluctance of philanthropists to provide cash transfers is not the only 
instance of philanthropic paternalism.  Take, for example, Zuckerberg’s 
much-publicized attempts to reform Newark’s public school system.204  Sev-
eral years before forming the CZI, Zuckerberg joined then-Governor Chris 
Christie and then-Mayor Cory Booker on The Oprah Winfrey Show to an-
nounce a $100 million matching gift to transform Newark’s troubled 
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schools.205  The idea, in the words of Booker, was to use the Newark experi-
ment to “creat[e] a bold new paradigm for educational excellence.”206  Zuck-
erberg echoed this sentiment, hoping that the effort would “turn Newark into 
a symbol of educational excellence for the whole nation.”207  In essence, this 
experiment aspired to implement the shared goals of the philanthropically-
driven public school reform movement (that is, expansion of charter schools, 
removing ineffective teachers, rewarding good teachers, and streamlining the 
management of school systems) in a manner that might be replicated across 
the country. 
This effort, which may have received more criticism than it deserved,208 
“generated strong community backlash and one of the nastiest fights over 
urban education in memory.”209  The community resistance was not due to 
the motivations and goals of Zuckerberg, Booker, and Christie.  Indeed, many 
community members, including both residents and teachers, recognized the 
need to reform Newark’s school system.210  But again, the results of philan-
thropic efforts are sometimes less important than the process.  In this case, 
the Newark community took issue with the aggressively top-down approach 
to the endeavor.211  In one of the more galling examples, access to the en-
deavor was largely limited to donors who gave $5 million or more on an 
annual basis, which effectively excluded not only individual community 
members with experience in Newark’s public education system, but also the 
local organizations which had been working in Newark public schools for 
decades.212  Dale Russakoff, author of The Prize: Who’s in Charge of Amer-
ica’s Schools, noted “there seems to be a sense that everybody knows as 
much about how to fix schools as teachers do and as educators do.”213  As 
one critic of philanthropy-driven education reform stated, “Education reform 
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comes across as colonial to people who’ve been here for decades” because 
reform is “done to people rather than in cooperation with people.”214  No 
matter how well-intentioned, the very structure of philanthropy promotes the 
desires of a select number of wealthy individuals, ignores the self-determina-
tion of the recipients, and represents a disrespect for the ability of beneficiar-
ies to order their affairs and prioritize their needs. 
C.  Philanthropy Is Amateuristic 
Oscar Wilde, in his screed against the evils of capitalism, asserted that 
philanthropists “seriously and very sentimentally set themselves to the task 
of remedying the evils that they see [in poverty]. But their remedies do not 
cure the disease: they merely prolong it.”215  In arguing for socialism, Mr. 
Wilde used the charitable instinct as evidence of something inherently im-
moral in capitalism.216  However, Mr. Wilde might have been better suited 
arguing not that philanthropy exacerbates the problem, but rather that it often 
fails to address the targeted ills.  This is because philanthropists, more often 
than not, have very little experience in their chosen areas of focus.  More 
pointedly, why did Mark Zuckerberg believe success in launching a social 
media empire somehow provided him the knowledge necessary to fix public 
education? 
Obviously, there is no logical reason to assume that Zuckerberg’s par-
ticular genius in monetizing a social media website is transferable to other 
fields, but the conceit of philanthropy is that a wealthy person knows the best 
way to address a social ill for no reason other than the possession of wealth.  
This is blatantly irrational, but it is also the fundamental belief undergirding 
the philanthropic regime.  It, therefore, bears stating the absurdly obvious: 
“[B]eing skillful at accumulating wealth and power does not necessarily 
mean one is good at creating social value.”217  In more frank terms, Callahan 
noted that philanthropists “often know little about the complex problems they 
aspire to solve—yet may have too much hubris to recognize it—which raises 
an obvious risk of screwups.”218 
This amateurism takes many forms.  For traditional philanthropists, it is 
often born out of simple lack of experience.  For philanthrocapitalists, the 
amateurism is intensified by their inclination to import business strategies to 
philanthropic endeavors.  The following Sections will discuss two business 
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strategies that are problematic in the philanthropic realm: the instinct to mo-
nopolize discussions219 and the willingness to embrace trial-and-error ap-
proaches.220 
1.  “Monopolizing the Market of Ideas”221 
To address their lack of experience, many philanthropists turn to ex-
perts.  For example, Bill Gates was no expert on malaria when the Gates 
Foundation undertook malaria research, so the Gates Foundation hired lead-
ing disease experts and funded pharmaceutical research by experienced sci-
entists.222  This is an admirable way to tackle a problem: Rather than rely 
upon your own instincts and suspicions, defer to expertise.  In such cases, the 
problem is not the philanthropist’s instinct to seek out experts.  Rather, the 
problem is the tendency of philanthropists to ignore expert advice that con-
tradicts the philanthropist’s chosen path.223 Often, philanthropists seek out 
experts not to find a right answer, but rather to confirm their suspected an-
swer.224 
Once again, Zuckerberg’s efforts to reform Newark’s public education 
system is illustrative.225  In that case, the philanthropists sought out experts 
to determine if their goal of reforming Newark schools within five years was 
feasible.226  One of those experts was John King, the Deputy New York State 
Education Commissioner, whom the philanthropists hoped would serve as 
Newark’s superintendent.227  King refused the offer, largely because he 
viewed the five-year reform plan as unrealistic.228  He thought “it could take 
almost that long to change the system’s fundamental procedures and to raise 
expectations across the city for children and schools.”229  Rather than heed 
King’s advice and adjust the timeline, the philanthropists sought out an expert 
that would embrace their chosen approach.230 
The phenomenon of ignoring expert advice when it does not comport 
with the philanthropist’s preconceived solution often involves more than 
simply ignoring a single expert.  More disturbingly, as philanthropists limit 
their consultations to those experts that agree with the philanthropist’s chosen 
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approach, the result is a chorus of expert opinions that simply parrot the 
philanthropist’s preconceived notions.231  As philanthropists throw more 
money behind their now-bolstered preconceived notions, they quickly be-
come the loudest voice in any given argument.232  By monopolizing the field 
in this manner, there is little diversity of opinions and the philanthropist’s 
chosen solution to a problem becomes the only solution considered. 
This may be the natural result when  philanthropists transfer the lessons 
learned from business to philanthropy, but when philanthropists use the 
mechanism that helped them amass their fortunes—monopolization of the 
market—on their philanthropic efforts, dissenting voices are overwhelmed 
and ignored.233  As Professor Bosworth asserts, Microsoft “has thrived finan-
cially not due to its ongoing prophetic excellence but its longstanding mo-
nopoly status.”234  Whether or not this is true, monopolization is unfortu-
nately the approach many philanthropists adopted.235  The squelching of 
diverse opinions in the approach to malaria was briefly discussed in a previ-
ous Section of this Article,236 but it is not peculiar to malaria.  It is, for exam-
ple, also the process that resulted in the philanthropic approach to public ed-
ucation reform.237 
It is not an exaggeration to state that a handful of private foundations 
have provided the dominant (if not the only) voice in public education re-
form.  By leveraging the strength of their wealth and the implicit threat of 
defunding, the Gates Foundation, the Broad Foundation, and the Walton 
Family Foundation have practically dictated the public education reform dis-
cussions.238  Policymakers and educators, in order to avoid offending philan-
thropists and the resultant negative financial repercussions, engage in self-
censorship.239  Friedrich Hess, Director of Education Policy at the American 
Enterprise Institute, described a “world where philanthropists are royalty” 
with the power to defund “academics, activists, and the policy commu-
nity.”240  As one education advocate explained it, funding by the Gates Foun-
dation in education reform “was so large and so widespread, it seemed for a 
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time as if every initiative in the small-schools and charter world was being 
underwritten by the [Gates F]oundation.”241  This advocate claimed that “[i]f 
you wanted to start a school, hold a meeting, organize a conference, or write 
an article in an education journal, you first had to consider” the Gates Foun-
dation.242 
This market dominance resulted in a depressingly paltry intellectual de-
bate due to philanthropists “[m]onopolizing the [m]arket of [i]deas.”243  By 
dominating the public conversation, the solutions proposed by private foun-
dations became the only solutions available for policymakers.  As described 
by Bosworth, the philanthropists used their donations to influence experts,244 
journalists,245 and politicians.246  The result of the collective philanthropic 
investment in public education reform was a wholesale adoption of the 
philanthropists’ general prescription for America’s failing schools: “charter 
schools, performance-based pay for teachers, national testing standards, and 
the power to effect a ‘turnaround’ by firing the staff of low-performing 
schools.”247 
Despite the difficulty in implementing these endeavors, the policy dis-
cussions did not stray far from the philanthropists’ agenda.  As Bosworth 
argued, 
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The ideological presumption is that the donor’s philanthropic pro-
jects, like the commercial products that made him wealthy, have 
been rigorously tested in a Darwinian marketplace where only the 
best ideas can survive.  But whether or not this is even true of his 
corporate ventures . . . , it does not apply in practical fact to his 
philanthropic ones whose funding is dependent on the donor’s will 
alone.248 
The result is that an amateur’s instinctive solutions are artificially ele-
vated to dominate the public discourse simply because of the amateur’s fi-
nancial support.  As the amateur’s ideas gain momentum, they invest more 
money to find additional support for the particular solution.  As more money 
is invested, the will for dissent is weakened.249 
If the philanthropist happens to be right (or if the philanthropist hap-
pened upon the right expert in crafting the solution), then there is no harm 
other than the theoretical harm to democracy.  If, however, the solution is 
ineffective, society not only wasted time and money (and in the case of edu-
cation reform, precious years of a generation of children), but also allowed 
philanthropists to silence dissidents and disincentivize alternate proposals. 
2.  “MOVE FAST AND BREAK THINGS”250 
Philanthrocapitalists’ inclination to monopolize ideas is not the only 
problematic business practice they use.  Another market-based strategy 
widely adopted in modern philanthropy is the entrepreneurial willingness to 
fail.251  In defending his embrace of failure, Gates once noted, “Success is a 
lousy teacher.  It seduces smart people into thinking they can’t lose.”252  
Many philanthropists imported this philosophy into their philanthropic activ-
ity.  As Callahan stated, “Major donors gunning for disruptive change tend 
to shrug off the risk of failure.  It’s part of any process for solving prob-
lems.”253  Callahan quoted Bill Ackman, a hedge fund investor and philan-
thropist, as being so “comfortable with failure” that he admitted “there is 
some new mistake we haven’t yet made that we’ll make in the future.  But as 
long as we learn from it, it’s fine.”254 
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But this trial-and-error approach has a more troubling effect when it ap-
plies to matters of public concern.255  Consider again the education reform 
movement and, specifically, the Zuckerberg-driven reform measures in New-
ark.256  Frustrated with Booker’s difficulty in finding a qualified superinten-
dent to oversee the reforms, Zuckerberg sent Booker one of Facebook’s mo-
tivational posters to spur action.257  The poster said, “DONE IS BETTER 
THAN PERFECT.”258 
When testing a product on the market, this approach might make sense. 
There may not be a better way to determine if the public has an appetite for 
a particular good or service than letting the market speak.259  However, when 
dealing with the education of children, the trial-and-error approach has much 
greater consequences.  As noted by Russakoff, the approach to education re-
form in Newark was “to launch multiple missions at once, assuming some 
would crash on takeoff, some would fall by the wayside, and some would go 
the distance.”260  Again, if the subject matter at issue is a consumer product 
or service, this is a perfectly reasonable way to proceed.261  However, one 
must ask: When a child is stuck in one of the school programs that “crash on 
takeoff,” what happens to that child?262  Further, this trial-and-error approach 
“happened not just in Newark, but in New York City and in many other places 
when the Gates Foundation poured $2 billion into a national push to break up 
large high schools and shift students into small schools—only to later aban-
don this strategy.”263 
Zuckerberg admitted that one of his personal goals for the Newark pub-
lic education reform experiment was to “learn from his experience and be-
come a better philanthropist in the process.”264  In a Facebook post, Zucker-
berg noted the mistakes made in the Newark experiment and said, “It’s very 
important to understand the desires of a community, to listen and learn from 
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families, teachers, elected officials and other experts.”265  While this is a no-
ble goal of self-betterment and an admirable expression of self-awareness, 
one wonders how the parents and children of Newark feel about being the 
test case for a rich person learning how to be a better philanthropist.266  Zuck-
erberg’s lesson in the value of democracy was learned at a great cost, as the 
Newark experiment disrupted the lives of thousands of Newark children.267 
D.  The Negatives of Philanthropy Are Interconnected 
The antidemocratic, paternalistic, and amateuristic aspects of philan-
thropy are interconnected, and an increase in one aspect exacerbates the oth-
ers.268  Philanthropy’s amateurism (for example, the belief that the ability to 
develop and monetize a social media website is somehow viewed as wisdom 
that can be applied to any intractable social problem)269 springs from a hubris 
that aggravates the antidemocratic nature of philanthropy, in that a strong 
certitude renders outside input unnecessary.  The belief that corporate success 
is evidence of philosophical wisdom “helps explain the political authority 
that Gates and his allies are now gaining to direct public policy on his pet 
issues of global health and national education reform, absent the usual re-
quirement of holding public office.”270  It is in this manner that philan-
thropy’s amateurism is tied to its antidemocratic nature. 
Further, the antidemocratic nature of philanthropy directly feeds into 
and from philanthropy’s paternalistic roots.  Dr. Salamon summed up the 
problem by noting, “The nature of the [charitable] sector . . . comes to be 
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shaped by the preferences not of the community as a whole, but of its wealth-
iest members.”271  There is, therefore, a direct connection between the pater-
nalistic nature of philanthropy (the belief that philanthropists know what is 
best for beneficiaries) and the antidemocratic features of philanthropy (be-
cause philanthropists know best, they do not need outside input).  Without 
meaningful input from the beneficiary community, philanthropy will reflect 
the distinct views of the wealthy, and this persistent failure to entertain either 
dissenting voices or the desires of the philanthropic targets (that is, the anti-
democratic aspect of philanthropy) feeds philanthropy’s paternalism.  The 
education reformer Howard Fuller concisely described the problem by label-
ing reformers “arrogant” and said, 
It’s not even what you do sometimes, it’s the way you treat people 
in the process of doing it.  If your approach is to get a lot of smart 
people in the room and figure out what ‘these people’ need and 
then we implement it, the first issue is who decided that you were 
smart?  And why do you think you can just get in a room and make 
decisions for a community of people?272 
This blunt assessment of top-down, philanthropic-driven education re-
form perfectly captures how the paternalistic nature of philanthropy leads to 
antidemocratic approaches to problems.  Because the reformers assume they 
know how to best solve a problem (that is, because they are the “smart people 
in the room”), they convince themselves that they do not need to engage the 
beneficiary community or approach the problem with external input. 
The interconnectivity of the three primary negative aspects of philan-
thropy results in an unfortunate momentum.  The antidemocratic nature of 
philanthropy feeds the amateuristic aspects of philanthropy by dominating 
any given conversation about a social issue and stifling voices of dissent.  
Paternalism feeds amateurism, which may be sufferable if there was some 
democratic check on such risk-taking. 
III.  THE LIMITS OF PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS AND THE FREEDOM OF LLCS 
Having established the inherent negatives of philanthropy, this Part dis-
cusses how private foundations represent a limited bulwark against these tra-
ditional criticisms and how the LLC’s relative freedom from regulation ex-
acerbates these negatives.  First, however, it is helpful to explore the 
purported reasons philanthropists have begun to use LLCs for their philan-
thropic endeavors. 
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Zuckerberg briefly discussed the reasons that motivated him and Chan 
to form an LLC rather than a private foundation in, unsurprisingly, a Face-
book post.273  According to Zuckerberg, he and Chan opted to eschew the 
more traditional private foundation in favor of the LLC form because the 
LLC “enables [the CZI] to pursue [its] mission by funding non-profit organ-
izations, making private investments and participating in policy debates.”274  
Zuckerberg highlighted the LLC’s flexibility as the determining factor by 
saying, 
What’s most important to us is the flexibility to give to the organ-
izations that will do the best work—regardless of how they’re 
structured.  For example, our education work has been funded 
through a non-profit organization, Startup:Education, the recently 
announced Breakthrough Energy Coalition will make private in-
vestments in clean energy, and we also fund public government 
efforts, like the CDC Ebola response and San Francisco General 
Hospital.275 
In a single sentence, Zuckerberg identified three distinct families of po-
tential grant recipients: nonprofit organizations, a consortium of for-profit 
businesses and nonprofit organizations,276 and government programs.277  By 
emphasizing the “flexibility” of the LLC, Zuckerberg implied that a private 
foundation would not be permitted to give money to support such projects.  
Whether or not this is true, Zuckerberg’s post suggests that the decision was 
driven by the flexibility of the form and the comparative inflexibility of pri-
vate foundations. 
Although flexibility is certainly an attractive feature of LLCs, this Arti-
cle posits that other limitations of the private foundation form may also per-
suade philanthropists to use LLCs.  Of course, it is dangerous to make as-
sumptions regarding the private motivations of individuals, but there is 
reason to doubt that the inflexibility of the private foundation form is the sole 
factor drawing philanthropists to LLCs.  There is, for example, no rule or 
regulation that would completely prevent a private foundation from investing 
in any of Zuckerberg’s identified projects.278  There are, however, a number 
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of other restrictions that limit the activities of private foundations, which 
likely contribute to philanthropists’ recent decisions to form LLCs.279  More 
specifically, this Part argues that philanthropists are attracted to the LLC 
structure because private foundations are subject to mandatory payouts, re-
porting and disclosure requirements, and limitations on certain political and 
lobbying activities.  The LLC is subject to none of these restrictions, and this 
Part argues that the lack of these restrictions results in an unacceptable free-
dom from regulation, oversight, and transparency. 
A.  Private Foundations: Not as Limited as Zuckerberg Suggests 
Zuckerberg strongly hinted that the LLC form was necessary to facili-
tate distributions to not only nonprofit organizations, but also for-profit en-
deavors by stating that the CZI “is structured as an LLC rather than a tradi-
tional foundation” to, among other things, “mak[e] private investments” in 
entities “regardless of how they’re structured.”280  The ability of an LLC to 
make such investments was, therefore, a key factor in the entity choice deci-
sion.  This justification echoes the decision by Omidyar to engage in philan-
thropy through an LLC, noting that “philanthropy is about improving the 
lives of others, independent of mechanism.”281 
Although Zuckerberg’s Facebook post suggests that private foundations 
are not permitted to invest in for-profit entities,282 this is not entirely correct.  
While private foundations are limited in how much voting control they may 
have in certain entities,283 some investments in for-profit entities may count 
toward the minimum distribution requirement. 
The minimum distribution requirement is discussed in more detail be-
low,284 but a brief discussion is warranted to explain the limitation—not the 
complete restriction—of private foundation investments in for-profit entities.  
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A private foundation is required to make certain distributions to maintain its 
tax benefits, and such distributions must meet two main requirements.285  
First, the distribution must be in support of a “religious, charitable, scientific, 
literary” or other public purpose.286  Second, the distribution may not be made 
to an entity controlled by the private foundation or owned by a disqualified 
person (which includes the foundation’s manager and substantial contribu-
tors).287  In other words, the distribution has to be charitable and the recipient 
must be an unrelated entity. 
Note there is no blanket restriction against private foundations from in-
vesting in for-profit entities.  Rather, the regulations focus on the purpose of 
the investment.288  If an investment will support a permissible charitable pur-
pose and the private foundation or certain enumerated related parties do not 
own the beneficiary, then the distribution will qualify.289 
If this appears to represent a surprisingly broad group of potential recip-
ients, that is likely because of the popular misconception that private founda-
tions are restricted to giving grants to nonprofit organizations.290  Although 
grants by private foundations to nonprofit organizations “comprise by far the 
majority of qualifying distributions,” there are a number of qualifying distri-
butions to entities other than nonprofit organizations, including the program-
related investment.291 
An investment is “program-related,” and, therefore, a qualifying distri-
bution, if (1) the “primary purpose” of the investment is to further the foun-
dation’s exempt purpose, (2) “no significant purpose” of the investment is 
producing income,292 and (3) the investment is not designed to influence leg-
islation or take part in political campaigns.293  A good example of a program-
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related investment is the Gates Foundation’s $15 million investment in Owl 
Ventures.294  Owl Ventures is a for-profit venture capital fund that invests in 
education technology companies.295  While Owl Ventures is interested in in-
vesting in companies “that seek to meaningfully drive improvement in stu-
dent achievement,” it is also interested in making a profit.296  In describing a 
$100 million education investment fund, Tory Patterson, Owl Ventures’ 
managing partner, emphasized not only the positive effects on student 
achievement, but also the profit potential of education entrepreneurs, whose 
performance “rival[s] high-achievers in other industries.”297  The Gates 
Foundation’s investment is intended to ensure Owl Ventures’ “investments 
will be in the service of those students most in need and that they will address 
clear gaps in the market.”298  Despite the fact that Owl Ventures is a for-profit 
entity, the Gates Foundation’s investment was not motivated to turn a profit.  
Rather, the Gates Foundation reacted to a perceived “funding gap that pose[d] 
a threat to the long-term scalability/sustainability of the industry” and in-
vested in an organization doing good work in the field.299 
In this manner, a private foundation (the Gates Foundation) may invest 
in a for-profit organization (Owl Ventures).  Although the administrative bur-
den of ensuring that any given investment would qualify as a program-related 
investment may have been enough to dissuade Chan and Zuckerberg to stay 
away from the private foundation form,300 the permissibility of program-re-
lated investments to count toward a private foundation’s mandatory payout 
requirement makes Zuckerberg’s stated reason for forming an LLC ring a bit 
hollow.  With this in mind, the balance of this Part explores additional rea-
sons that a philanthropist might choose an LLC over a private foundation, 
including regulations that subject private foundations to a mandatory distri-
bution requirement,301 prohibit private foundations from engaging in political 
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(Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.edsurge.com/news/2015-08-24-owl-ventures-launches-100-million-
education-investment-fund. 
 298.  How We Work: Owl Ventures, supra note 294. 
 299.  Id.  
 300.  See Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, supra note 33, at 2457 (“[E]nsuring . . . in-
vestments fall within the PRI exception would entail both cost and inherent risk for a . . . private 
foundation.”).   
 301.  See infra Section III.B. 
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activity and substantial lobbying,302 and impose extensive annual reporting 
requirements.303  Following the discussion of each regulation, this Part ad-
dresses how each restriction does not apply to LLCs.  Ultimately, the remain-
der of this Part argues that the absence of such restrictions leaves LLCs free 
to engage in antidemocratic, paternalistic, and amateuristic practices without 
limitation. 
B.  The Mandatory Distribution Requirement 
1.  Private Foundations Must Engage in Some Charity 
Perhaps the most well-known regulatory requirement for private foun-
dations is the mandatory distribution requirement.  Often cited in opinion 
pieces bemoaning the paltry charitable activity of some private founda-
tions,304 the rule might be succinctly stated as an annual requirement for pri-
vate foundations to spend at least 5% of the value of their assets, with certain 
permissible adjustments, in a charitable manner.305  This requirement ensures 
that private foundations dispose of some assets in a manner deemed charita-
ble by statute.306  In other words, in order to maintain tax-exempt status, pri-
vate foundations must make certain distributions in support of a religious, 
charitable, scientific, literary, or other public purpose.307 
This was not always the case.  Prior to 1969, when the mandatory payout 
rules were enacted, regulators relied upon a rule that prohibited tax-exempt 
organizations from an “unreasonable accumulation of income.”308  Under this 
rule, a private foundation was subject to loss of its tax-exempt status if it 
accumulated unreasonable amounts of income.309  The contours of this re-
quirement proved to be difficult to discern, with little direction provided by 
                                                          
 302.  See infra Section III.C. 
 303.  See infra Section III.D. 
 304.  See, e.g., Ray D. Madoff, A Better Way to Encourage Charity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/opinion/a-better-way-to-encourage-charity.html. 
 305.  I.R.C. § 4942(e) (2012). 
 306.  Id.; see id. § 170(c)(2)(B) (defining “charitable contribution” as a contribution to “orga-
nized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, 
or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities 
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children 
or animals”). 
 307.  See id. § 170(c)(2)(B); see also id. § 4942(e). 
 308.  See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 7.27.16 (I.R.S. 1999), 
www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-027-016.html (last updated Sept. 10, 2017) (“Prior law provided 
that a private foundation would lose its exemption if its aggregate accumulated income was unrea-
sonable in amount or duration for carrying out its exempt purposes.”).  
 309.  I.R.C. § 504(a)(1) (1964). 
 48 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:1 
courts.310  This uncertainty bred widespread noncompliance with the rule and 
resulted in a disappointing lack of giving by private foundations.311 
The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) diagnosed the problem as one of 
enforcement, noting that “[s]ince reasonableness or unreasonableness is es-
sentially a subjective determination, and since the only available sanction—
loss of exempt status—was often viewed as unduly harsh,” the unreasonable 
accumulation of income rule “was rarely applied.”312  Further, because the 
unreasonable accumulation of income rule was poorly enforced, the result 
was the bestowal of favorable tax treatment on private foundations without 
any guarantee of a concomitant charitable effect.313  Indeed, the IRS con-
cluded that the rule “proved largely ineffective” and that “charity may have 
received no benefit whatever or very belated benefit.” 314  Thus, to the extent 
the federal government was looking for some return in the form of charitable 
spending, the unreasonable accumulation of income rule was a failure.315 
To address this, the statute was revised to force private foundations to 
make distributions of certain amounts toward charitable purposes316 known 
as the “mandatory distribution requirement.”317  In contrast to the unreason-
able accumulation of income rule, the mandatory distribution requirement is 
rather successful in inspiring increased charitable spending by private foun-
dations.318 
At this point, it is important to note that forcing a private entity to ex-
pend funds in a certain manner stands in stark contrast to America’s sacro-
sanct belief in property rights.  Normally, after the government extracts taxes, 
a person or entity is free to spend (or not spend) their or its money in any 
legal manner.  To justify this uncharacteristic limitation on private property 
rights, defenders of the mandatory distribution requirement cite that private 
foundations enjoy significant tax benefits.319  These tax benefits include, of 
                                                          
 310.  See Joel H. Feld, Unreasonable Accumulation of Income by Foundations, 16 CLEV.-
MARSHALL L. REV. 362, 368 (1967). 
 311.  See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 308, § 7.27.16 (“Before the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969, there was little legal pressure on private foundations to distribute income to charity.”).  
 312.  Id.  
 313.  Id. 
 314.  Id. 
 315.  See id. 
 316.  Initially, the rule required a private foundation “to distribute the greater of . . . its adjusted 
net income or minimum investment return on assets held for production of income.”  Id.  The rule 
was later amended to require private foundations to “distribute only their minimum investment re-
turn[,] statuatorily [sic] defined as 5%.”  Id. 
 317.  In addition to quantifying the amount required to be distributed, the rule change also ad-
dressed the inflexible sanction, imposing excise taxes on private foundations that failed to make 
mandatory distributions as opposed to revocation of favorable tax status.  Id. 
 318.  See Homer C. Wadsworth, Private Foundations and the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 39 L & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 255, 260 (1975) (“It is not surprising that [the minimum pay-out requirement of 
the Revenue Act of 1969] led to an appreciable increase in the level of foundation giving.”). 
 319.  See I.R.C. § 501(a) (2012). 
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course, the entity’s exemption from federal taxes on income320 and the found-
ers’ ability to take a tax deduction for donations to their foundation.321  Fur-
ther, the foundation’s investment income enjoys a low tax burden,322 there is 
favorable treatment with respect to capital gain on donations of appreciated 
property,323 and donated assets are generally not subject to estate taxes.324  In 
effect, the minimum distribution requirement allows a wealthy person to reap 
these favorable tax benefits so long as the private foundation “pays” for the 
favorable tax status by spending a certain amount in a manner that Congress 
determined is in the public interest.  In this way, the federal government can 
ensure that the favorable tax status is not simply a gift to a wealthy person. 
When considering all of the generous tax benefits enjoyed by private 
foundations, one might reasonably conclude that the mandatory distribution 
requirement is not commensurate with the potential forgone tax revenue.325  
A 5% payout is a relative pittance compared to the tax savings, and it must 
be viewed as absolutely miniscule when one considers the fact that virtually 
all of the expenditures of public charities must be spent in furtherance of a 
charitable purpose and public charities are restricted from maintaining excess 
reserves.326  Thus, perhaps the mandatory distribution requirement is a rela-
tively minor obligation.  It is, however, better than nothing.  And with the 
LLC form, that is precisely what we have: nothing. 
                                                          
 320.  Id.  However, as Professor Brakman Reiser noted, “[F]or philanthropic groups running at 
a loss, this exemption is not necessarily a great boon.”  Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 
supra note 33, at 2453. 
 321.  The amount of the deduction is limited to a percentage of the donor’s adjusted gross in-
come.  I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vii) (2012). 
 322.  Id. § 4940(a) (“There is hereby imposed on each private foundation which is exempt from 
taxation under section 501(a) for the taxable year, with respect to the carrying on its activities, a tax 
equal to 2[%] of the net investment income of such foundation for the taxable year.”). 
 323.  Id. § 170(b)(1)(D)(i) (“In the case of charitable contributions . . . of capital gain property, 
the total amount of such contributions of such property . . . for any taxable year shall not exceed the 
lesser of—(I) 20[%] of the taxpayer’s contribution base for the taxable year, or (II) the excess of 
30[%] of the taxpayer’s contribution base for the taxable year over the amount of the contributions 
of capital gain property to which [170(b)(1)(C)] applies.”). 
 324.  See Harvey P. Dale & Roger Colinvaux, The Charitable Contributions Deduction: Federal 
Tax Rules, 68 TAX LAW. 331, 357 n.185 (2015) (“The statutory chain is a bit tedious, but the result 
is fairly clear: [T]ransfers to charities do not trigger the tax.” (citing I.R.C. §§ 2601, 2611(a), 2612, 
2613(a), 2651(e)(3) (2012))). 
 325.  See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, How Long Should Gifts Just Grow?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/12/giving/12money.html. 
 326.  See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3) (2017) (describing tax-exempt entities as those “organized and 
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educa-
tional purposes.”); Ellen Aprill, The IRS’s Tea Party Tax Row: How “Exclusively” Became “Pri-
marily,” PAC. STANDARD (June 7, 2013), https://psmag.com/news/the-irss-tea-party-tax-row-how-
exclusively-became-primarily-59451 (noting that “[t]he UBIT rules acknowledged and accepted 
that exempt organizations could engage in activities that did not carry out their exempt purpose.  
Thus, the earlier statutory language requiring that [S]ection 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations 
operate ‘exclusively’ for their exempt purposes no longer accurately described the applicable 
law.  Treasury regulations then reinterpreted ‘exclusively’ as ‘primarily.’”). 
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2.  LLCs: No Requirement to Engage in Charity 
An LLC, by design, provides a great amount of freedom and independ-
ence to its owners.327  Practically speaking, an LLC may engage in any ac-
tivity as long as the activity is legal.328  Of most relevance to this discussion, 
there is no mandatory payout rule for LLCs.  For the CZI, the Omidyar Net-
work, and the Emerson Collective, the consequence is the absence of a re-
quirement to spend any money toward the organizations’ respective stated 
charitable purposes. 
Although Chan and Zuckerberg seem truly sincere in their hopes to pur-
sue their promises to cure diseases and improve public education,329 there is 
no regulatory requirement to do so.  If the CZI decided to sit on the contribu-
tion for the next fifty years, there would be no recourse available to anyone.  
There would, for example, be no grounds for the IRS to impose any penalties 
or to demand any charitable spending.  Further, there is no duty to pursue 
charitable activity, even if the stated purpose of the LLC is to engage in phil-
anthropic works.  Indeed, even if a creative attorney could argue that there is 
such a duty, there are no realistic plaintiffs to bring the case.  After all, it is 
highly unlikely that Chan and Zuckerberg would choose to sue themselves. 
It is reasonable to assume that the philanthrocapitalistic affinity for 
LLCs is born in part from a wariness of the private foundation’s minimum 
distribution requirement.  Chan and Zuckerberg hinted at this concern in the 
CZI announcement, noting that the CZI’s goal to cure disease “will take 
time.”330  The founders preached patience with the CZI’s promised progress, 
noting that “[o]ver short periods of five or ten years, it may not seem like 
we’re making much of a difference.  But over the long term, seeds planted 
                                                          
 327.  Indeed, in many states, the founders of LLCs may even opt out of traditional fiduciary 
duties.  See generally Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law, 34 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 465 (2009). 
 328.  Most LLC statutes permit LLCs to engage in any lawful activity. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. 
CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A-201 (2015) (“A limited liability company may be organized under this title 
and may conduct activities in any state related to any lawful business, purpose, investment, or ac-
tivity, whether or not for profit, except the business of acting as an insurer.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.6 
§ 18-106(a) (2018) (“A limited liability company may carry on any lawful business, purpose or 
activity, whether or not for profit, with the exception of the business of banking.”). 
 329.  Kurt Wagner, Priscilla Chan is Running One of the Most Ambitious Philanthropies in the 
World, RECODE (July 10, 2017, 8:00 AM), www.recode.net/2017/7/10/15771676/priscilla-chan-fa-
cebook-philanthropy-mark-zuckerberg-initiative-cure-diseases (noting some of CZI’s “plans are so 
ambitious and grand as to seem almost fantastical.  Last fall, CZI pledged $3 billion over the next 
decade to try and ‘cure all diseases’ in their daughter’s lifetime.  Chan has been vocal about the 
organization’s involvement in trying to map every cell in the human body, and CZI is spending $50 
million over the next five years to fund research by scientists and engineers it calls ‘investigators,’ 
like [a] Stanford professor developing a $1 microscope.  Chan is also working with Summit Public 
Schools in California to fundamentally change the education system—she wants students around 
the country to be taught differently.”). 
 330.  See Zuckerberg, supra note 1. 
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now will grow, and one day, you or your children will see what we can only 
imagine: a world without suffering from disease.”331 
Although this statement does not explicitly relate to a private founda-
tion’s mandatory payout requirements (that is, it does not suggest that the 
CZI might want to avoid making distributions in any given year), it does hint 
that the CZI is adopting a long timeline for its philanthropic efforts.  Perhaps 
Chan and Zuckerberg plan to make a number of large initial investments and 
wait (presumably a period longer than five or ten years) before engaging in 
more giving.  The mandatory distribution requirement of the private founda-
tion might not permit such patience, but an LLC has no such distribution re-
quirements.  Indeed, the CZI, as an LLC, could make absolutely no distribu-
tions and suffer no consequences. 
3.  LLCs Lack of Mandatory Distribution Requirements Exacerbates 
the Antidemocratic Nature of Philanthropy 
The lack of a mandatory distribution requirement for LLCs has clear 
implications for the antidemocratic nature of philanthropy.  Although some 
argue that the rule does not demand enough of our private foundations,332 the 
mandatory distribution requirement provides some assurance that private 
foundations will engage in some publicly-approved charitable work.  That is 
to say, private foundations will at least spend some amount in a manner that 
a democratically-elected legislature established as charitable.  Although the 
universe of qualifying distributions is quite broad (for example, a wide 
breadth of activities might arguably fall within the “charitable” category),333 
there is at least some limitation as to what constitutes permissible activity.  
This list of allowable distributions, however broad and ill-defined, was 
adopted by a democratically-elected government, and, therefore, represents a 
small limit on the antidemocratic aspect of philanthropy.  While many private 
foundations may prove to be nothing more than vanity projects for their 
wealthy founders, the mandatory distribution requirement provides, in the 
very least, some comfort that a specified amount of the organization’s assets 
will be spent in a publicly-blessed manner.  Even if the founder is determined 
to provide only the minimal charitable impact required to bolster his or her 
public profile, the private foundation form assures some charitable spending. 
It is important to note that, even with the mandatory distribution require-
ment, private foundations are still free to engage in a number of antidemo-
cratic activities.  Indeed, the discussion above concerning the antidemocratic 
                                                          
 331.  Id. 
 332.  Rob Reich, Not Very Giving, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013), www.ny-
times.com/2013/09/05/opinion/not-very-giving.html; see also Strom, supra note 325. 
 333.  See Eric Franklin Amarante, Why Don’t Some White Supremacist Groups Pay Taxes?, 67 
EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2045, 2054 (2018) (highlighting the absurdly broad definition of education that 
encompasses universities, museums, planetariums, and white supremacist groups).  
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philanthropic efforts to address public education and public health stands de-
spite the fact that the philanthropists in those scenarios are subject to the man-
datory distribution requirement.  Clearly, the mandatory distribution require-
ment does not completely eliminate the antidemocratic aspects of 
philanthropy, and the regulatory regime reflects the belief that individualism 
and private property rights (that is, the ability of the wealthy to spend their 
dollars in areas concerning the public realm) are more important than bene-
ficiary self-determination.  However, the mandatory distribution requirement 
provides some protection.  This is simply not the case with LLCs.  An LLC 
has absolutely no duty to make any charitable expenditures and may act in a 
singularly selfish manner without upsetting any laws or regulations.  It is a 
private entity in every way. 
C.  Restriction Against Lobbying and Political Activity 
1.  Private Foundations’ Limits in the Political Arena 
In addition to the mandatory distribution requirement, private founda-
tions are subject to many of the restrictions that apply to all Section 501(c)(3) 
organizations.  One of these restrictions is the prohibition against engaging 
in a significant amount of lobbying, with the Code stating that “no substantial 
part of the activities” of any Section 501(c)(3) organization may constitute 
the “carrying on [of] propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence leg-
islation.”334  This limitation applies to other tax-exempt entities,335 but the 
restriction is more severe for private foundations.336  If a private foundation 
engages in any lobbying, significant or otherwise, it “will incur an excise tax 
on those expenditures [that] is so significant that it generally acts as a lobby-
ing prohibition”337 and may result in revocation of tax-exempt status.338 
Unlike the mandatory payout requirement, the genesis of the limitation 
on lobbying is found well before the 1969 amendments to the Code.339  The 
                                                          
 334.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
 335.  Id. 
 336.  See HOPKINS, supra note 12, at 591 (“If a charitable organization, otherwise tax-exempt . . . 
fails to meet the federal tax law requirements for exemption because of attempts to influence legis-
lation, a tax in the amount of 5[%] of the lobbying expenditures may be imposed.”). 
 337.  Lobbying Activity of Section 501(c)(3) Private Foundations, I.R.S. (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/private-foundations/lobbying-activity-of-section-501c3-
private-foundations; see I.R.C. § 4945(d)(1) (2012).  
 338.  The Restriction of Political Campaign Intervention by Section 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Or-
ganizations, I.R.S. (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organiza-
tions/the-restriction-of-political-campaign-intervention-by-section-501-c-3-tax-exempt-organiza-
tions [hereinafter Restriction of Political Campaign Intervention]. 
 339.  Despite the persistence of the limitation over the years, there is no universally accepted 
justification for the limitation.  See Elias Clark, The Limitation on Political Activities: A Discordant 
Note in the Law of Charities, 46 VA. L. REV. 439, 446 (1960) (“It is not clear from the early history 
of the restriction on political activities whether it evolved as a result of carefully considered policy, 
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constraint extends at least as far back as 1919, when the regulations specifi-
cally prohibited tax-exempt organizations from disseminating “controversial 
or partisan propaganda.”340  To the extent this prohibition was unclear, courts 
weighed in on the breadth of the restriction, with one early decision holding 
that it was not charitable to attempt to repeal anti-birth control laws.341  In 
this decision, Judge Learned Hand wrote, “Political agitation . . . however in-
nocent the aim . . . must be conducted without public subvention; the Treas-
ury stands aside from them.”342  This limitation was echoed in the Revenue 
Act of 1934,343 with the addition of the “substantial” qualifier, and the Su-
preme Court finally ruled it was constitutional in the 1983 decision of Regan 
v. Taxation With Representation of Washington.344  In Regan, Justice 
Rehnquist painted the prohibition as a Congressional decision, noting: 
The system Congress has enacted provides [a] subsidy to nonprofit 
civic welfare organizations generally, and an additional subsidy to 
those charitable organizations that do not engage in substantial lob-
bying.  In short, Congress chose not to subsidize lobbying as ex-
tensively as it chose to subsidize other activities that nonprofit or-
ganizations undertake to promote the public welfare.345 
                                                          
or of the Treasury’s understandable desire to place outer limits around any exemption, or on the 
assumption that established property law required it.”). 
 340.  Id. at 446 n.32 (quoting Treas. Reg. 45, art. 517 (1919)). 
 341.  Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).  
 342.  Id. at 185.  Judge Hand continued to say targeted lobbying might be deemed appropriately 
charitable, such as “[a] state university . . . trying to get appropriations from the Legislature” or “a 
society of booklovers . . . [that] took part in agitation to relax the taboos upon works of dubious 
propriety.”  Id.   
 343.  See Clark, supra note 339, at 447–49; see also Todd Brower, Whose Voice Shall Be Heard? 
Lobbying Limitations on Section 501(c)(3) Charitable Organizations Held Constitutional in Regan 
v. Taxation With Representation, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1017, 1018 (1984).  
 344.  461 U.S. 540 (1983); I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (granting tax exemption to entities wherein 
“no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to 
influence legislation”). 
 345.  Regan, 461 U.S. at 544.  There is some question as to the validity of the “subsidy theory” 
of charitable organizations to which Justice Rehnquist alludes.  In examining the potential theoret-
ical justifications for tax-exemption, Professor Henry Hansmann argued (in part) that the tax-ex-
emption of charities was necessary to overcome the failure of the government to provide the char-
ity’s services and a failure of the market to provide adequate funds to charitable organizations.  See 
Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).  However, as Pro-
fessors Mark Hall and John Colombo note, if government failure is the reason for the tax-exemption, 
then why shouldn’t for-profit organizations that engage in similar activities also receive favorable 
tax status?  See Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax 
Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379 (1991).  There remains significant debate as to any theoretical 
justification for tax-exemption.  See Nina Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Ex-
emption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 424 
(1998) (“[I]t may appear remarkable that there is no universally-accepted theory to explain the fun-
damental reason underlying the deliberate and continued conferral of [tax] exemption on all quali-
fying charitable organizations.”). 
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Despite Justice Rehnquist’s assertion, legislative history suggests that 
the limitation on lobbying may not have been the result of a congressional 
intent to provide a lower subsidy on lobbying activities.346  Rather, the limi-
tation seems to be an attempt to curtail self-interest.  As Professor Elias Clark 
noted, “It appears that the proponents wanted to restrict political agitation, 
selfishly motivated, to secure some personal interests of the donor.”347  To 
support this claim, Clark cited the following statement by Senator David 
Reed: “There is no reason in the world why a contribution . . . should be de-
ductible as if it were a charitable contribution if it is a selfish one made to 
advance the interests of the giver of the money.”348  Thus, the reasons for the 
lobbying limitation are either to ensure that private foundations do not use 
tax subsidies to interfere with our democratic process or to keep private foun-
dations from engaging in subsidized self-dealing. 
In addition to the lobbying limitation, there is also a restriction against 
private foundations engaging in political campaign intervention.  With re-
spect to this restriction, the Code provides a refreshingly clear, bright-line 
rule: Section 501(c)(3) organizations may not engage in any activities that 
interfere with political campaigns.349  The definition of organizations eligible 
for Section 501(c)(3) status describes an organization “which does not par-
ticipate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of state-
ments), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candi-
date for public office.”350  To the extent this is not clear enough, the IRS 
website states that campaign contributions and public statements for or 
against candidates constitute prohibited political activity.351  Violation of this 
prohibition “may result in denial or revocation of tax-exempt status and the 
imposition of certain excise taxes.”352 
2.  The Political Freedom of LLCs 
The restrictions on lobbying and political activity would likely have 
been problematic for Chan and Zuckerberg, if they had not formed a LLC, 
because of the CZI’s explicit goal to “participat[e] in policy debates . . . with 
the goal of generating a positive impact in areas of great need.”353  It takes 
no great leap of logic to envision such participation as lobbying, and the not-
                                                          
 346.  See Brower, supra note 343, at 1019 (“A review of the debates surrounding the enactment 
of the statute reveals that ‘the legislation was narrowly conceived . . . .’”  (quoting Clark, supra note 
339, at 446–49)). 
 347.  See Clark, supra note 339, at 447. 
 348.  Id. at 447 n.40 (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934)). 
 349.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
 350.  Id. 
 351.  Restriction of Political Campaign Intervention, supra note 338. 
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so-subtle implication of Zuckerberg’s post is that the private foundation re-
strictions on lobbying and political activity were determinative factors in 
choosing the LLC form. 
LLCs, unlike private foundations and other tax-exempt organizations, 
have absolutely no restriction on the amount of lobbying activity in which 
they might engage.354  Indeed, a number of the country’s leading lobbying 
firms—entities that do little more than lobby and engage in political activ-
ity—are formed as LLCs.355  Imagine that after a decade of attempts to 
change the public education system, the CZI determined that investments in 
charter schools and personalized learning curricula were not effective with-
out legislative changes.  As an LLC, the CZI could completely suspend all 
funding activities and focus solely on lobbying elected officials; but, if it 
were a private foundation, the limitations on lobbying and political activity 
would make such a pivot impossible. 
The particulars of the restrictions are not germane to this discussion 
simply because, from the perspective of Zuckerberg and Chan, such specifics 
were not likely determinative in the decision to form an LLC.  More likely, 
the mere existence of any limitation on the ability for a private foundation to 
exert legislative influence, regardless of the amount, would convince the cou-
ple to seek a less restrictive form.356  Thus, this Article ignores the more tech-
nical aspects of how an organization would go about precisely complying 
with the restriction.  Rather, it is sufficient to state that the private foundation 
form is subject to a limitation on the amount and type of legislative activity 
in which it may engage357 and, more importantly, LLCs are not subject to a 
similar limitation. 
3.  LLCs Lack of Lobbying and Political Activity Restrictions 
Exacerbate the Antidemocratic Nature of Philanthropy  
The LLC’s lack of restrictions on lobbying and political activity carries 
obvious antidemocratic implications.  Officials imposed the restrictions to 
ensure that private foundations were not able to parlay a generous tax subsidy 
into political influence.  More than the mandatory distribution requirement, 
                                                          
 354.  Other than, of course, laws restricting all actors from certain lobbying efforts.  See, e.g., 
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1612 (2012). 
 355.  For instance, Republic Consulting, led by former Congressman Geoff Davis, is an LLC 
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 357.  See Lobbying, I.R.S. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/lobbying. 
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the restrictions against political activity and lobbying operate to curtail phil-
anthropic influence in the public realm.358  Although private foundations may 
still dominate a field in an antidemocratic manner by spending money in sup-
port of certain programs,359 philanthropists operating through private foun-
dations may not directly interfere in the political process.  To the extent we 
are concerned that philanthropists might leverage their power to influence 
policy decisions by, for example, dictating the reform of public education or 
prioritizing certain health initiatives without the input of the electorate,360 an 
ability to directly lobby elected officials or support candidates for office rep-
resents a galling instance of antidemocracy.  Thus, so long as philanthropy is 
conducted through private foundations, these restrictions operate to provide 
some protection against the inherent antidemocratic instincts of philanthro-
pists.  However imperfect, these restrictions are better than the absolute lack 
of political and lobbying limitations on LLCs. 
D.  Transparency and Opacity 
1.  Private Foundation Annual Reporting Requirements 
Private foundations, similar to public charities, are required to submit 
annual information returns to the IRS and make the returns public.361  These 
returns are vital sources of information, serving as the public’s “primary or 
sole source of information” about tax-exempt organizations.362  The annual 
information returns are designed to “give both the IRS and the public an im-
proved window into the way tax-exempt organizations go about their vital 
mission.”363  As then-IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman said, “Tax-exempt 
organizations provide tremendous benefits to the people and communities 
they serve, but their ability to do good work hinges upon the public’s trust.  
The [annual information returns] foster this trust by greatly improving trans-
parency and compliance in the tax-exempt sector.”364  Thus, the purpose of 
the annual information returns is clear: to not only give the IRS the raw data 
                                                          
 358.  But see Joanne Barkan, Charitable Plutocracy: Bills Gates, Washington State, and the Nui-
sance of Democracy, NONPROFIT Q. (Apr. 11, 2016), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/04/11/plu-
tocracy-bill-gates-philanthropy-washington-state/ (“Multibillionaire philanthropists use their per-
sonal wealth, their tax-exempt private foundations, and their high-profile identities as 
philanthropists to mold public policy to a degree not possible for other citizens.  They exert this 
excessive influence without public input or accountability.”). 
 359.  Id. 
 360.  See Bosworth, supra note 88; Rogers, supra note 80. 
 361.  BRUCE R. HOPKINS ET AL., THE NEW FORM 990: LAW, POLICY, AND PREPARATION 4 
(2009) (“In general, a tax-exempt organization must . . . [m]ake each annual information return 
available for a period of three years . . . without charge . . . .”). 
 362.  I.R.S., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990: RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME 
TAX 2 (2017) [hereinafter FORM 990 INSTRUCTIONS]. 
 363.  See HOPKINS ET AL., supra note 361, at 1. 
 364.  Id. 
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it needs to ensure compliance,365 but also to give the public the ability to 
monitor and assess the activities of tax-exempt organizations.366  In discuss-
ing this feature of annual information returns, then-Commissioner Steven T. 
Miller emphasized the “need to ensure the public and other stakeholders have 
a sufficient line of sight into [tax-exempt organization] activities so they 
know what their contributions and our foregone taxes are paying for.”367 
There are a number of different annual information returns for different 
tax-exempt entities, each with their own goal.368  Private foundations are re-
quired to submit a Form 990-PF in order to determine the tax owed on in-
vestment income, if any, and to provide details about the foundation’s chari-
table activities.369 
Form 990-PF provides a treasure trove of information.370  The bulk of 
the disclosures are financial in nature, with the first four parts of the form 
requiring a detailed analysis of revenue and expenses (including specifics re-
garding all contributions, gifts, and grants received in the applicable year) as 
well as balance sheets and capital gains and losses.371  In addition to financial 
details, Form 990-PF asks foundations to detail the activities conducted dur-
ing the tax year, including specific questions regarding the foundation’s: (1) 
attempts to influence legislation; (2) engagement in political activity; (3) 
changes in organizational documents; and (4) compliance with the mandatory 
distribution requirement.372  Private foundations must also provide infor-
mation concerning substantial contributors and indicate whether the organi-
zation engaged in any self-dealing transactions.373  Another section of Form 
990-PF requires the private foundation to provide compensation for: (1) all 
                                                          
 365.  Id. at 5 (noting that one goal of the annual information returns was “enabling the IRS to 
more efficiently assess the risk of any noncompliance by the organization”).   
 366.  Id. (noting that one goal of the annual information returns was “[e]nhancing transparency 
by providing the IRS and the public with a realistic picture of the filing organization and its opera-
tions”). 
 367.  Steven T. Miller, Comm’r Tax Exempt & Gov’t Entities, I.R.S., Remarks Before Inde-
pendent Sector, L.A., Cal. (Oct. 22, 2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/stm_isec-
tor_10_22_07.pdf. 
 368.  For example, public charities are required to submit either the Form 990, Form 990-EZ, or 
Form 990-N depending on the organization’s gross receipts.  FORM 990 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 
362, at 2.  Organizations that normally receive less than $50,000 in gross receipts use the Form 990-
N, organizations that have between $50,000 and $200,000 in annual gross receipts use the Form 
990-EZ, and organizations that have more than $200,000 in annual gross receipts use the Form 990.  
Id. at 2–3. 
 369.  See I.R.S., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990-PF: RETURN OF PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS OR 
SECTION 4947(A)(1) NONEXEMPT CHARITABLE TRUST TREATED AS A PRIVATE FOUNDATION 2 
(2017) [hereinafter INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990-PF].  
 370.  But see PHILANTHROPY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES, supra note 72, at 69 (“[F]oundations 
are often black boxes, stewarding and distributing private assets for public purposes, as identified 
and defined by the donor, about which the public knows very little and can find out very little.”). 
 371.  See INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990-PF, supra note 369, at 13–21. 
 372.  See id. at 23–27. 
 373.  See id. 
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officers, directors, trustees, and managers of the private foundation; (2) the 
private foundation’s five highest paid employees; and (3) the private founda-
tion’s five highest paid independent contractors.374  Finally, the Form 990-
PF requires the private foundation to provide a narrative description of the 
organization’s four largest charitable activities and the two largest program 
related investments.375  Thus, the Form 990-PF provides information about 
the organization’s financial position, the salaries paid, the contributions re-
ceived, and the activities conducted.  It is, quite simply, an incredible amount 
of information.376 
Perhaps the most valuable aspect of the annual information returns is 
that they are not merely submitted to the IRS, but they must also be made 
publicly available.377  Private foundations are required to provide copies of 
the three most recent annual information returns to any member of the public 
who asks.378  In this manner, the activities of tax-exempt entities are subject 
to both regulatory and public scrutiny. 
2.  The Relative Privacy of LLCs 
Although not explicitly identified as a justification for forming the CZI 
as an LLC, it seems likely that the rather intense disclosure requirements im-
posed upon private foundations played an important role in the decision.  The 
transparency required of private foundations is in stark contrast to a private 
for-profit entity like an LLC.  Unlike tax-exempt organizations, LLCs can 
operate in almost complete privacy.  LLCs do not have any public filing that 
resembles Form 990-PF, and an LLC’s programs and activities may be con-
ducted in complete secrecy.379  In many states, an LLC is required to provide 
no more than its registered agent’s name and address.380  Some states require 
                                                          
 374.  See id. at 27. 
 375.  See id. at 28–29. 
 376.  Given the amount and detail of information required by the Form 990-PF, it should not be 
surprising that the form requires a significant investment of time and attention.  The IRS estimates 
that private foundations completing Form 990-PF should anticipate over 140 hours of recordkeep-
ing, more than 28 hours spent “[l]earning about the law or the form,” and nearly 34 hours of pre-
paring the form.  See id. at 36. 
 377.  See Public Disclosure and Availability of Exempt Organizations Returns and Applications: 
Documents Subject to Public Disclosure, I.R.S., www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/public-disclo-
sure-and-availability-of-exempt-organizations-returns-and-applications-documents-subject-to-
public-disclosure (last updated Apr. 17, 2018). 
 378.  Id. 
 379.  Patricia Cohen, Need to Hide Some Income? You Don’t Have to Go to Panama, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/08/business/need-to-hide-some-income-you-
dont-have-to-go-to-panama.html. 
 380.  See James S. Henry, The World’s Largest Tax Haven? Guess Who, AM. INTEREST (June 
18, 2018), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/06/18/the-worlds-largest-tax-haven-guess-
who/#_ftnref24 (“For those with assets to hide, the U.S. LLCs’ greatest advantage is cheap ano-
nymity.  To date, no U.S. state offers a public registry of ‘ultimate beneficial owners’ (‘UBOs’) for 
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the names of the managers and owners, but setting up the managers or owners 
as other LLCs easily obscures even this minimal amount of information.381  
Unlike with private foundations, members of the public cannot demand ac-
cess to LLC finances or activity reports.382  LLC tax returns are private, and 
LLCs are not required to report on activities or programs’ successes or fail-
ures. 
The upshot of this lack of transparency is that if an LLC claims to en-
gage in charity, there is no way for any person or regulating agency to mean-
ingfully police such charitable activity.  Without an equivalent of Form 990-
PF, the only way for the public to learn of an LLC’s charitable expenditures 
is through investigative journalism or if the owners of the LLC voluntarily 
decide to publicize such expenditures. 
3.  The Opacity of LLCs Exacerbates the Paternalism and 
Amateurism of Philanthropy 
The requirement of publicly-available annual information returns in-
creases IRS and public scrutiny of private foundation activities, which in turn 
reduces the potential for excessively paternalistic and amateuristic behavior.  
This is primarily because a philanthropist is forced to consider how the pro-
gram will be received by the general public.383  However, the utter opacity of 
                                                          
LLCs, corporations, or trusts.  And eight U.S. states, including Delaware, Wyoming, and New Mex-
ico, don’t even require LLC founders to disclose the identities of their managers or ‘members’ 
(UBOs).  Others, like California, do require this information, but they also permit their own LLCs 
to be owned by ‘foreign’ LLCs, including those from these willfully blind eight states.”). 
 381.  Cohen, supra note 379. 
 382.  Rather, members of the public may demand all they like, but there is no legal requirement 
to provide any such disclosures.  See Brakman Reiser, supra note 20, at 24 (“If founders opt for a 
philanthropy LLC, the entity may not file any return whatsoever.  The member of a single member 
LLC must simply report income from it on her own (confidential) return.”). 
 383.  There is some evidence to suggest that a reasonable amount of disclosure by an organiza-
tion will reduce the risk-taking activities of the organization.  See George Loewenstein et al., Dis-
closure: Psychology Changes Everything, 6 ANN. REV. ECON. 391, 396 (2014) (“In the domain of 
labor law, for example, one of the most significant applications of targeted transparency is the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration’s Hazardous Communication Standard (HCS), which 
does not ban worker exposure to hazardous materials but seeks ‘to ensure that the hazards of all 
chemicals produced or imported are evaluated, and that information concerning their hazards is 
transmitted to employers and employees.’  As Estlund notes, ‘the HCS appears to have greater im-
pact on employers’ than on employees’ decisions, and greater impact where there is a union that 
can interpret and act on the rather complex information involved.’ . . . Similarly, whether disclosure 
of conflicts of interest by doctors, accountants, or investment professionals mitigates or exacerbates 
the problems caused by these conflicts may well depend less on the reactions of recipients than on 
the reactions of disclosers, who might respond by scaling back those conflicts or might instead feel 
licensed by the disclosure to pursue their own interests at the expense of their clients.  Likewise, on 
the basis of existing evidence, it is reasonable to predict that calorie labeling requirements will have 
a larger impact on producers than consumers.  Thus, we argue, when disclosure requirements do 
have a beneficial effect, the cause is often not the changes in consumer behavior that many advo-
cates of disclosure view as the primary causal mechanism, but rather changes in the behavior of 
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LLC operations renders any such public scrutiny impossible, thereby permit-
ting paternalistic and amateuristic behavior. 
This is unfortunate because the forced transparency of private founda-
tions plays a significant role in combating the paternalism and amateurism of 
philanthropic activities.  Due to the lack of any democratic check on the ac-
tivities of philanthropists, the only meaningful way to combat a philanthro-
pist’s overly paternalistic or amateuristic activities is to publicize them.  This 
is what happened, for example, in Zuckerberg’s experiment to transform pub-
lic education in Newark, which inspired a tremendous amount of criticism.384  
The first two sentences of an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal adequately 
summed up much of the negative press: “What happened with the $100 mil-
lion that Newark’s schools got from Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg? . . . Not 
much.”385 
Critics pointed to how the money was spent—or more accurately, how 
the money was wasted—bemoaning the lavish salaries paid to experts,386 the 
teacher raises that produced no measurable improvement,387 and payments to 
silence political objection.388  Critics also highlighted the complete lack of 
democratic involvement in the reform effort389 and the fact that the imposed 
reforms were largely untested.390  There is no reason to doubt that Zuckerberg 
would prefer to avoid such scrutiny in the future.  Much of the information 
that provided the basis for criticisms came from the public filings of Zucker-
berg’s philanthropic organization.  If it had been conducted through an LLC, 
there would have been no requirement to disclose salaries or any other pay-
ments.  Much of the data that provided fodder for criticisms of the Newark 
public education reform experiment would be hidden from public view. 
IV.  WHAT SHOULD WE DO? 
After such an extended discussion of the potential harms of private 
spending, it bears repeating: The general public does not have a right to dic-
tate how individuals spend their money.  A rich person may—and many 
                                                          
producers.” (citation omitted) (quoting Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace 
Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 377 (2011))). 
 384.  See supra notes 208–214. 
 385.  James Piereson & Naomi Schaefer Riley, Zuckerberg’s $100 Million Lesson, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/zuckerbergs-100-million-lesson-1444087064.  
 386.  See RUSSAKOFF, supra note 90. 
 387.  Id. 
 388.  Jonathan A. Knee, The Melting of Mark Zuckerberg’s Donation to Newark Schools, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/27/business/dealbook/the-melting-of-
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 389.  See supra notes 209–214 and accompanying text. 
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wealthy people often do—spend money in a manner that would offend the 
vast majority of Americans.391  However, no matter how unanimous public 
opinion may be, we do not have the right to stop a rich person from spending 
their money in the manner they see fit.  Sometimes it may be spent in a pa-
ternalistic way (buying, for example, a reliable and safe car for one’s teenage 
child),392 or it may be spent in an amateuristic manner (for example, investing 
in an ill-conceived business venture).393  In either case, the negative effects 
of the decisions are limited to the wealthy individual and the general public 
is not affected.  On the other hand, when a wealthy person uses their wealth 
to address issues of public concern, the calculus is different.  Philanthropy is 
not akin to a rich person buying a Mercedes; rather, it is a rich person telling 
America’s children what they will learn in school and how they will learn 
it.394  In such matters, the public has a legitimate interest. 
However flawed, traditional philanthropic efforts operate through a ve-
hicle that curbs the potentially negative aspects of philanthropy.395  Any an-
tidemocratic aspects of philanthropy are tempered by the existence of the 
mandatory payout requirement396 and the limitations on lobbying and politi-
cal activity.397  Similarly, any paternalistic and amateuristic aspects are mod-
erated by the transparency requirement.398 
As illustrated, the recent trend of using for-profit vehicles to engage in 
philanthropic activity removes all of these tempering mechanisms.399  The 
regulatory bulwarks designed to encourage the positive aspects of philan-
thropy do not exist in the for-profit realm.  Rather, philanthrocapitalism en-
courages entities to engage in matters of public concern free from meaningful 
regulation and limitations.400 
However, what can we do?  The Article’s introduction proposed this 
question, but it bears repeating: How might a country control the way rich 
people spend their money?  Needless to say, this is difficult to address.  Our 
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 392.  See supra Section II.B. 
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 394.  See supra Section II.A.1. 
 395.  See supra Sections III.B–D. 
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 397.  See supra Section III.C. 
 398.  See supra Section III.D. 
 399.  See supra Sections III.B.3, III.C.3, III.D.3. 
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strident belief in individual property rights inspires suspicion over any regu-
lation over philanthropy.  Additionally, it is important to recall that the LLC 
does not enjoy the generous tax benefits of private foundations.401   
The limits and reporting requirements of private foundation are justified 
because they are given tax-favorable status.  In other words, if we are com-
fortable with bestowing a tax subsidy on private foundations in exchange for 
slightly more democracy and transparency in the activities of our philanthro-
pists, might we also be comfortable with less democracy and transparency if 
the philanthropist does not take advantage of any tax-benefits?  If the preced-
ing Sections were convincing, the potential negatives of philanthropy are too 
great to permit under the secrecy of LLCs.  However, reasonable arguments 
can be made that the LLC’s lack of favorable tax treatment justifies any light 
regulatory approach to the activities of such entities, be they philanthropic, 
for-profit, or otherwise.  However, if the current balance is unacceptable (that 
is, the potential dangers of philanthrocapitalism are too great), the following 
sections explore some potential solutions. 
A.  Adjust Incentives 
One of the most obvious solutions is to adjust the incentives of the enti-
ties to either make the private foundation more attractive for philanthropists 
or to make the LLC less attractive.  If we alter the incentives of LLCs and 
private foundations, we might be able to convince philanthropists to choose 
the favored entity (that is, a private foundation) over the disfavored entity 
(that is, an LLC).  We could, for example, increase the financial incentive to 
donate to private foundations by making donations to private foundations tax 
deductible in the same manner as donations to public charities.402  Alterna-
tively, we might consider lightening the regulatory burden on private foun-
dations by, for example, decreasing the mandatory payout,403 loosening the 
political activity prohibition,404 lowering the restriction on lobbying activi-
ties,405 or reducing the administrative burden associated with transparency.406  
                                                          
 401.  However, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 does provide a lower tax-burden for certain 
pass-through entities, for which certain LLCs may qualify.  Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 
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 404.  See supra Section III.C. 
 405.  See supra Section III.C. 
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Similarly, if the LLC form was less attractive to philanthrocapitalists, the pri-
vate foundation form might resume its place as the preferred entity for phi-
lanthropy.  If we either increase the costs of operating as an LLC or require 
more transparency from LLCs, the private foundation regulatory regime 
might become more attractive to philanthropists. 
These options, however, are a bit extreme.  While the concerns of oper-
ating philanthropy through for-profit vehicles are troubling, the LLC is the 
preferred form for entrepreneurs for the very reasons it is becoming the fa-
vored form for philanthrocapitalists: simplicity, ease, and flexibility.407  LLC 
formations outpace the formation of all other for-profit entity forms, serving 
as the primary vehicle for small business development and entrepreneur-
ship.408  If additional disclosure requirements or taxes were imposed on the 
LLC form, the negative impact on small business formation would be devas-
tating. 
Rather than changing long-standing rules and regulations regarding pri-
vate foundations and LLCs, there might be a more direct approach.  If the 
concern is the haphazard and ineffective programs forced upon the public by 
the wealthy, then perhaps the solution should focus on the activities rather 
than the perpetrators of the activities.  In other words, there might be a regu-
latory solution. 
B.  Regulating and Licensing Philanthropy 
In many ways, it is intuitive to regulate and license philanthropy in the 
same manner that occupations are regulated and licensed.  Consider some of 
the traditional areas in which philanthropy operates: public education,409 
health,410 legal services,411 and social work.412  The professionals in each of 
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these areas require some type of occupational license.413  In many states, pub-
lic school teachers must obtain state licenses or certifications,414 health pro-
fessionals are licensed and regulated by medical boards,415 lawyers are sub-
ject to oversight by state bar associations and state licensing requirements,416 
and social workers are subject to state oversight.417  In light of this, it seems 
reasonable to require philanthropists with similar aims to prove some level 
of professional competency before engaging in these areas. 
Take, for example, the license to practice law.  In most states, before an 
individual may represent another person in court, the individual must first 
graduate from law school,418 take and pass a state bar exam,419 submit to a 
character and fitness inquiry to determine the person’s fitness for the profes-
sion,420 and abide by continuing legal education requirements.421  Setting 
aside any questions as to the effectiveness of these mechanisms,422 the fact 
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remains that a person goes through significant vetting procedures before 
gaining the right to practice law. 
An analogous regime could be imposed upon philanthropy.  Imagine 
that a philanthropist sets their sights on reforming public education.  This 
hypothetical philanthropist has ideas about teacher qualifications, content of 
standardized testing, and adding incentive pay for teachers.  In such a case, 
where the philanthropist intends to upend the nature of public education, it is 
not absurd to require some vetting process.  Rather than giving the philan-
thropist access to children to either engage in trial-and-error reform efforts423 
or to impose untested curricular changes, why not impose some level of scru-
tiny on the proposed measures before unleashing them on children? 
With this licensing regime in place, the form of the entity no longer 
matters.  The regulatory entity could impose, for example, certain governing 
standards, conflict of interest principles, public input requirements, and min-
imum standards for certain reform efforts.  The philanthropist may engage in 
their chosen philanthropy with a private foundation or an LLC.  So long as 
the entity meets the regulatory requirements, the form of the entity does not 
matter. 
This proposal raises many questions and concerns.  There remains a le-
gitimate question as to whether all philanthropy would require such a licens-
ing regime.  Or, more precisely, which specific forms of philanthropy should 
be subject to licensure?  If a wealthy person wants to promote the arts and 
invest money in operas, ballets, and theater, it might not be appropriate (or 
desirable) to require a vetting procedure, as any state involvement would give 
rise to concerns of censorship or favoritism.424  It also seems absurd to impose 
upon a ballet club or an art museum the same scrutiny as a national public 
education reform movement. Museums and ballets do not intrude upon the 
public’s life in the same manner as closing public schools. Further, a licens-
ing regime would likely encompass more than just the intended philan-
throcapitalistic activity.  For example, many for-profit entities engage in ac-
tivities that affect great numbers of people.  The task of finely defining a class 
of activities to fall within the licensure regime may be a task too difficult to 
achieve.  Finally, any attempt to rigorously license philanthropy might result 
in disincentivizing all philanthropic efforts. 
These questions and concerns are legitimate and require careful thought.  
They are not, however, insurmountable.  Similar questions were raised con-
cerning the formation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).  
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For example, concerns that the proposed regulatory regime might stifle phil-
anthropic giving echo predictions that the SEC would ‘“seriously retard eco-
nomic recovery[,] result in unemployment . . . ,’ make it difficult for ‘new 
and speculative corporations [to obtain] long-term capital,’” and would ulti-
mately force “American corporations to go abroad for capital.”425  Addition-
ally, concerns that philanthropic activity is too large to police are reminiscent 
of worries that “it was not feasible to regulate ‘unorganized’ or over-the-
counter securities markets, because this would entail ‘building up a Federal 
policing agency on such a scale as to be impracticable.’”426 Certainly, the 
SEC has not eradicated all securities fraud or misconduct by public compa-
nies, but the SEC oversees a regulatory regime that protects consumers and 
investors and instills some level of confidence in the public.  It is not out-
landish to imagine a similar regime for philanthropic matters of public inter-
est. 
Admittedly, the possibility of establishing such a regime is very low.  A 
formal licensing regime requires considerable investment to create an infra-
structure to implement and govern the regime, not to mention the political 
will to create such a scheme.  Given these obstacles, a more realistic option 
might be to foster public pressure for philanthropists to engage with intended 
beneficiaries in order to ensure community support for the project or activity.  
In other words, philanthropic activity might require a social license to oper-
ate. 
C.  A Social License to Operate 
Although it has ancient roots,427 the idea of a social license to operate 
has become more popular in the past two decades.428  A social license to op-
erate is defined variously as: an endeavor having “the broad acceptance of 
society to conduct its activities”;429 an operation’s “ongoing approval within 
the local community and other stakeholders”;430 and “a socially constructed 
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perception that [an activity] has a legitimate place in the community.”431  A 
fair synthesis of these definitions is that a social license to operate represents 
a particular community’s acceptance and approval of an endeavor to proceed. 
1.  Roots in the Extractive Industry 
The modern social license to operate finds its genesis in the mining in-
dustry.432  In many ways, this is not surprising.  While mining companies 
bring tremendous economic potential, they come with similarly great costs.  
These costs are usually born by neighboring communities in the form of en-
vironmental harm or health concerns.433  While these communities may reap 
some of the benefits of the extractive activities, the bulk of the wealth pro-
duced by mining companies is enjoyed by the owners of the companies and 
the purchasers of the extracted product.  Faced with this reality, communities 
resisted mining operations, picketed mining sites, and pressed local political 
officials to refuse licenses.434 
Mining companies, aware that “[e]xploration and extraction activities 
typically take a heavy toll on the environment and on the lives of people in 
the vicinity,” quickly recognized the potential costs of limited community 
support for a particular project.435  Many such companies now go to great 
lengths to obtain the affected community’s blessing before engaging in min-
ing operations.436  The World Bank recognized “a growing interest by gov-
ernment policymakers, civil society, communities, and mining companies on 
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the sustained development of mine-impacted communities as part of the de-
bate around the costs and benefits of mineral development.”437  This interest 
gave rise to the social license to operate.  The license, which is analytically 
distinct from a regulatory license administered by a governmental agency, 
generally refers to a local community’s acceptance or approval of 
a project or a company’s ongoing presence.  It is usually informal 
and intangible, and is granted by a community based on the opin-
ions and views of stakeholders, including local populations, abo-
riginal groups, and other interested parties.438 
Because of this “informal and intangible” nature, social licenses to op-
erate are not required by any governing body with policing powers.439  How-
ever, in the mining industry, social licenses to operate are “increasingly re-
garded as a practical necessity before a project or activity—regulated or 
not—can proceed.”440 Even if a project is compliant with the law, the mining 
company might obtain a social license to operate because the license func-
tions, in essence, as the moral authority to continue a particular operation, 
providing a legitimizing cloak for any given endeavor.441 
2.  Establishing Philanthropy’s Social License to Operate 
Because the social license to operate “refers to mainly tacit consent on 
the part of society towards [certain] activities,” there is little reason to limit 
its application to mining companies.442  Indeed, some scholars have already 
noted potential application of social licenses to operate “beyond the extrac-
tive industries” to reach “virtually any kind of business activity that might 
stir up controversy.”443  It was applied to other industries in which commu-
nity approval might be sought (or even required), including “wind, solar, bi-
omass, wave, geothermal, and other renewable energy technologies” where 
although there may be broad political support, individual community ap-
proval might be withheld.444 
Unlike mining companies, philanthropists enjoy near-unanimous sup-
port in popular opinion.  The complaints of philanthropy outlined in this Ar-
ticle have persisted over centuries, but they come from a small minority of 
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critics and have little influence in the activities of philanthropists.  This is 
because philanthropy’s overwhelming feedback is positive.445  Given the 
widespread support for philanthropy, it might be said that philanthropy en-
joys a social license to operate.  But the use of for-profit vehicles for philan-
thropic activity changes the calculus.  Because philanthropy through for-
profit vehicles exacerbates the inherent negatives of philanthropy, the atmos-
phere in which the social license to operate was granted no longer exists. 
There is some evidence that philanthropists recognize that their social 
license to operate is in jeopardy.  With the rise of philanthrocapitalist activi-
ties, where untested charitable ideals are imposed upon individual communi-
ties in the hope of finding something that might work on a larger scale, 
philanthropists, like extracting companies, have begun seeking permission 
from the beneficiary community before engaging in specific endeavors.  For 
example, in the Gates Foundation’s most recent endeavor to reshape Ameri-
can public education—a promise to “invest more than $1.7 billion in public 
education” to “develop[] and test[] new approaches to teaching”—the Gates 
Foundation decided to take a new approach.446  Rather than determine the 
solution without asking the beneficiary class (that is, paternalism), teachers 
and schools administrators (that is, amateurism), or the general public (that 
is, antidemocracy), the Gates Foundation issued a “[r]equest for [i]nfor-
mation” to learn “how intermediaries and secondary school teams have suc-
cessfully used continuous improvement methods to improve postsecondary 
outcomes for Black, Latino and/or low-income students, as well as how to 
build the capacity of organizations to do this work in the future.”447  To justify 
the decision, the Gates Foundation said it “hope[s] to hear from practitioners, 
particularly those we have never worked with before, who can help us better 
understand” how certain networks of schools might work to improve out-
comes.448  This is a welcome change from the usual top-down approach of 
philanthropy.  It appears that the Gates Foundation learned the value in com-
munity approval of their projects, and this might be the first step by the Gates 
Foundation to establish (or re-establish) a social license to operate in the area 
of public education. 
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3.  Identifying the Licensor 
An argument that a social license to conduct philanthropy exists begs 
the question: Who is the licensor?  When a philanthropist sets sights upon 
reshaping the American public education system, it might seem difficult, if 
not impossible, to determine who has the authority to grant or revoke the 
license.  In the still-budding literature on social licenses to operate, the an-
swer is found in stakeholder theory.449 
To identify stakeholders, one should identify “any group or individual 
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objec-
tives.”450  In the context of public education, this involves teachers, parents 
of students, students, and school administrators.  In other words, the very 
populations who often feel ignored by philanthropic efforts to reshape public 
education. 
While defenders of education reformers might note that philanthropists 
often seek input from administrators, and usually seek input from politicians 
(who were, at least theoretically, elected by the parents and teachers refer-
enced above), this represents a persistent problem of stakeholder theory: the 
strategic identification of stakeholders to obtain the appearance of legiti-
macy.451  In this practice, the philanthropist might try to obtain a social li-
cense through the most efficient means possible by focusing on those “stake-
holders who, in a given situation, can effectively influence the outcome of a 
[philanthropist’s] actions.”452  The obvious problem with this approach is that 
the philanthropist “might prioritize stakeholders in proportion to the power 
they have over its operations,”453 resulting in “marginalized stakeholders, 
[that is], those, who are affected negatively by a business enterprise’s actions 
but have no persuasive means of redress,” being “ignored and excluded from 
the social licensing process.”454  If this happens (that is, if we ignore the needs 
and interests of marginalized stakeholders), some scholars argue that “we 
cannot say that there is explicit or tacit consent, which is required for a social 
contract justification of business activity.”455 
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The more honest and effective option is a normative approach to stake-
holder identification.  That is, identification that honestly assesses the inter-
ests of the entire community to determine who is affected by a particular ac-
tion.  But we cannot reasonably rely upon philanthropists to engage in this 
costly and inefficient option.  Rather, this is where law can step in to fill 
“[g]aps between stakeholder power and the quality of their moral claim.”456 
The law’s role might involve granting certain populations standing to 
challenge certain activities, bestowing approval rights over certain projects, 
or even providing certain populations veto power over certain philanthropic 
activities.  Although this might sound extreme (or in the very least, overly 
idealistic), this is akin to the regulatory requirement of “fair prior informed 
consent” in the licensing process for exploration of certain lands owned by 
indigenous people in Norwegian Finnmark.457  Although the indigenous peo-
ple do not have the legal authority to stop the license, they have the ability to 
“oppose a governmental licensing decision in a court of law, which suspends 
the effectiveness of the license.”458  In such a manner, “the law transformed 
‘dormant’ stakeholders into ‘salient’ stakeholders to be reckoned with.”459 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As philanthropist Uday Khemka foresaw in 2006, “[r]elative to the cor-
porate environment, [philanthropists] are in the 1870s.  But philanthropy will 
increasingly come to resemble the capitalist economy.”460  This prediction 
was prescient, and the CZI will not be an outlier.  Rather, we should view the 
CZI founders’ decision to form the entity as an LLC as a harbinger of the 
future of philanthropic activity. 
To prepare for this trend, it is vital to consider the current philanthropic 
regime and how we might improve it.  Rather than viewing philanthropy as 
individual spending, beyond reasonable control due to American notions of 
individuality, we should instead identify philanthropy in certain areas of pub-
lic concern as private policymaking with an unnatural influence on the public 
sphere.  Because we rely upon the wealthy to, for example, reform public 
education or provide basic health services, we should strive to craft a regula-
tory regime that operates to limit the potential negative effects of philan-
thropic antidemocracy, paternalism, and amateurism.  
Absent a dramatic reconfiguring of the tax structure, the ultra-wealthy 
will continue to have a tremendous amount of influence in matters of public 
concern.  Given this influence, it is only reasonable to consider how it might 
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be better regulated, especially when matters of public concern are the targets 
of the philanthropic activity. As this Article illustrated, crafting an appropri-
ate regulation is difficult.  Adjusting the incentives inherent in the private 
foundation and LLC forms would be unwise, and striking the right balance 
in a licensing regime would be extremely difficult.  However, there is reason 
to be optimistic about the potential of a social license to engage in philan-
thropy.  As long as philanthropists honestly engage in obtaining stakeholder 
approval for philanthropic endeavors, the negative aspects of philanthropy 
will be curbed, regardless of the philanthropic vehicle’s legal form. 
 
